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IV.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

This appeal arises from summary judgments in favor of both Macris &
Associates, Inc. ("Macris") and Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), Thomas E. Mower and Leslie
D. Mower. The appeal presents important issues of successor liability, which no Utah
appellate court has addressed, and res judicata. Macris therefore respectfully requests
oral argument.
V.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Sections
78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code.
VI.
1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal on the

basis of res judicata of Macris' fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego
claims for relief beyond that awarded in a previous lawsuit erroneous because these
claims are different from the breach of contract claims on which Macris prevailed in an
earlier action? (R. at 276.) In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, "this court
considers 'all of the facts and evidence presented and every reasonable inference
arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."' Estate of
Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
Katzenberqer v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Furthermore,
because summary judgment presents only questions of law, this Court accords no
deference to the trial court's ruling and reviews it for correctness. ]dL
2.

Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal on the

basis of res judicata of Macris' claims for relief beyond that awarded in a previous
lawsuit erroneous because these claims arose well after the prior suit was commenced

1

and after Maoris' last pleading therein? (R. at 274.) The standard of review for this
issue is the same as the standard of review for issue number 1 above.
3.

Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal on the

basis of res judicata of Macris' claims for relief beyond that awarded in a previous
lawsuit erroneous because Neways was not a party to the earlier action and Macris did
not have a full and fair opportunity in the Images action to present its fraudulent
transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims? (R. at 269-70.) The standard of
review for this issue is the same as the standard of review for issue number 1 above.
4.

Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal on the

basis of res judicata of Macris' claims for relief beyond that awarded in a previous
lawsuit erroneous because none of the purposes for the res judicata doctrine are met
by such ruling, and such purposes were actually thwarted. (R. at 268-69.) The
standard of review for this issue is the same as the standard of review for issue number
1 above.
5.

Did the trial court correctly find, on the basis of the uncontroverted facts

before it, that because "Neways consists of substantially the same assets, products,
officers, and employees as lmages[, & Attitude, Inc.]," Neways is a "mere continuation"
of Images and Attitudes, Inc. and is therefore liable under the doctrine of successor
liability. (R. at 425.) In reviewing grants of summary judgment, an appellate court
accords no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for
correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah
1991). However, the appellate court will not consider factual matters raised for the first
time on appeal. Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (Utah 1983).
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VII.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5.
Schaer v. State. 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983).
Badger v. Badger. 254 P. 784 (Utah 1927).
Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert.
denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995).
VIII.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW.

Maoris & Associates, Inc. ("Maoris") commenced this action on February 15,
1995, against Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), Thomas E. Mower, and his wife, Leslie D.
Mower, asserting claims for fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego. (R. at
1-12.) On October 19, 1995, Neways and the Mowers filed their motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Maoris' claims were barred by a judgment in a prior lawsuit
against Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Images"), styled Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Images &
Attitude. Inc. etal.. Civil No. 910400358, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County for the State of Utah (hereinafter "Images action"). (R. at 182-83.) In that
action, Macris was awarded $487,638.87 plus interest on its breach of contract claims
against Images. (R. at 263.) In this action, on November 14, 1995, Macris filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment on its successor liability claim, arguing that
Neways was liable to Macris as Images' successor. (R. at 284-85.) The trial court
partially granted both motions. It ruled that all of Macris' claims for damages beyond
those awarded in the Images action were precluded. (R. at 422.) The court also ruled
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that Neways is the successor of Images and is therefore liable for the previous
judgment against Images. (R. at 422.)
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in August and September, 1992.
Then, Neways, Inc. ("Neways") was formed and fraudulently succeeded to a multilevel
marketing operation from Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Images"). (R. at 10, 11, 35, 171,
173, 259, 263, 239-40, 291-92, 323-24.) As a result, Macris was compelled to bring
this lawsuit against Neways and its officers, directors and shareholders, Thomas Mower
and his wife, Leslie Mower, to recover for obligations owed to it by Images and
adjudicated by Judge Guy R. Burningham in the Images action. (R. at 1-12.)
1.

The Images Action Arose Out of a 1989 Contract Between
Macris and Images and Images' Breach of that Contract.

The multilevel marketing business which was transferred to Neways had as its
object the sale of health and beauty products. (R. at 416.) Beginning in 1989, Macris
was a distributor for Images. (R. at 256.) In September, 1989, Images, through its
founder and president Thomas Mower, and Macris entered into an agreement
(hereinafter "Autoqualification Agreement") whereby Macris was to be paid at the
highest level provided for in the operation's marketing plan without having to meet any
of the usual qualifications for being compensated at such a level. (R. at 31, 258, 259.)
The amounts owed Macris were based on a portion of the profits of the monthly sales of
health and beauty products. (R. at 249-51, 258.) The Autoqualification Agreement was
part of a distributorship agreement between Macris and Images and was to endure
"through out the life of lmages[ a]s long as [Macris] is [a]ctive in promoting Images and
Images!' products." (R. at 31.)
On March 7, 1991, Images inexcusably and unjustifiably breached the
Autoqualification Agreement by suspending it and later terminating Macris as a
4

distributor. (R. at 251-52.) As a result of this breach, Macris commenced the Images
action on April 17, 1991. (R. at 214.) On or about June 9, 1992, Macris filed a Second
Amended Complaint. (R. at 192, 203.)
In the Images action, all of Macris' claims revolved around two transactions: the
formation of the Autoqualification Agreement and Images' breach of that contract. (R.
at 192-214.) The only defendants to the Images action were Images and Thomas
Mower. (R. at 203.) Neways was not named. Macris alleged that a valid
distributorship agreement existed between Images and Macris and that Images
breached that agreement. (R. at 192-203.) Macris sought reinstatement of the
Autoqualification Agreement, a declaration that Macris was entitled to a continuation of
such agreement and to sell or convey its distributorship, an accounting, and all
"damages resulting from termination of the automatic qualification status and of the
distributorship." (R. at 192-97.)
On June 6, 1995, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision, ruling in favor
of Macris. (R. at 134.) The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
September 14, 1995, concluding that Images had materially and unjustifiably breached
the Autoqualification Agreement. (R. at 251-52, 260, 263.) In calculating damages,
the trial court awarded Macris "damages for amounts which [Images] should have paid
to [Macris]. . . from March 1991 through August 1992." (R. at 250.) The court limited
Macris' recovery to damages incurred through August of 1992 because after that time,
"Neways took over the multilevel marketing operation." (R. at 250.) The court awarded
$487,638.87 plus interest. (R. at 263.) This Court affirmed Judge Burningham's
judgment in Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).
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2.

During the Images Action, Maoris Suffered Damages as a
Result of Conduct Wholly Apart from Images1 Breach of the
Autoqualification Agreement

Macris also suffered damages other than from Images' breach of the
Autoqualification Agreement and which was not at issue in the Images action. The
transfer of the multilevel marking business to Neways involved corporate
gamesmanship and chicanery and was perpetrated to limit Macris' recovery from
Images. (R. at 7-8, 11, 35, 173, 239-40, 259, 263, 291-92, 323-24.) Macris also
suspected that after the September 1, 1992 transfer, Images would be unable to satisfy
a judgment awarded in the Images action. (R. at 6.)
More specifically, the September 1, 1992 transfer bore many indications of
fraud;1 the transfer was made to, at least partially, defeat Macris1 valid claims in the
Images action; and Neways became a mere continuation of Images. The transfer of
the multilevel marketing business and other assets from Images to Neways occurred
after Macris commenced the Images action. In August 1992, Neways was incorporated
with Thomas Mower as president and his wife, Leslie Mower, as vice-president. (R. at
11, 173.) In fact, Neways' officers, directors and shareholders were the same members
of Thomas and Leslie Mowers' family as were also the officers, directors and
shareholders of Images. (R. at 11, 173, 292, 323-24.) On the eve of the first trial
setting of September 28, 1992, the newly formed Neways succeeded to Images'
multilevel marketing business. (R. at 259, 263.) Through this transfer, Neways
acquired substantially all of the assets, including all tangible assets and inventory, of
Images. (R. at 10, 35, 173.) All of the distributors in the multilevel marketing business,

1

The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act lists the following as "badges of fraud": "(a) the transfer or
obligation was to an insider; . . . (d) before the transfer was made or obligation incurred, the debtor had
been sued or threatened with suit; [and] (e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets." Utah
Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2); Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986).
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with the exception of Macris, were invited to become distributors under Neways with the
same rank and position. (R. at 35, 171, 239-40, 291, 323-24.) Also, Neways carried on
the same business as Images using the same facilities, employees, equipment,
furnishings and product formulations that Images had used before the transfer. (R. at
291, 323-24.) Only the name of the business was different. In short, the multilevel
marketing business was the pea, and Images and Neways were the shells in a shell
game perpetrated by Neways and the Mowers to defeat Macris' valid claims.
In their brief, Neways and the Mowers represent that "the majority of the . . .
shareholders, and officers for Neways and Images are not the same," citing the Affidavit
of Leslie Mower. (Brief of Appellant at 3.) Nothing in this affidavit, however, refers to
the shareholders or officers of either Neways or Images. (R. at 351-52.) Moreover, this
representation contradicts the uncontroverted factual record before the trial court. (R.
at 292, 323-24, 425.)
Of course, after the multilevel marketing business took on the new name of
"Neways," every effort was made during the Images action to erect a wall between
Images and Neways. (R. at 262.) In the Images action, Images consistently
maintained that Images and Neways were wholly separate corporations having little or
no relationship. (R. at 262.) In reality, Neways and Images were essentially the same;
only the name had been changed to the great detriment of Macris.
3.

To Recover for the Damages Suffered as a Result of the
September 1992 Transfer of Images' Multilevel Marketing
Business and Assets to Neways, Macris Instituted the Neways
Action.

Macris instituted this action against Neways and Thomas and Leslie Mower on
February 15, 1995. (R. at 12.) In its Complaint in the Neways action, Macris alleged
that the multilevel marketing business was still in operation after August of 1992 but
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only under a different name, and that the name change from "Images" to "Neways" was
perpetrated to defeat Macris' valid claims. (R. at 7-12.) Macris asserted claims for
fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 25-6-5, successor liability and alter ego. (R. at 2-11.)
Macris' fraudulent transfer claim alleged that Images' transfer of the multilevel
marketing business to Neways was fraudulent and accomplished to hinder Macris from
enforcing and collecting the obligation owed by Images. (R. at 7.) Macris sought
"amounts owed pursuant to a ruling from the court [in the Images action] and any future
judgment(s) against Images." (R. at 7.) Macris also alleged that the fraudulent transfer
was carried out willfully, maliciously and intentionally and therefore requested punitive
damages. (R. at 5.)
Macris' successor liability claim also arose out of the transactions that were the
subject of its fraudulent transfer claim. (R. at 3-5.) Macris asserted that Neways'
business is virtually identical to Images' former business, the multilevel marketing
operation's name change was done to defeat Macris' judgment and claims, and that
therefore Neways is the successor corporation to Images. (R. at 4-5.) Macris alleged it
was entitled to all amounts due from Images. (R. at 4.)
Also arising out of the August and September 1992 formation of and transfer to
Neways was Macris' alter ego claim. Macris alleged that Neways is the alter ego of
Images and that Thomas and Leslie Mower are the alter ego of Neways. (R. at 3.)
Macris alleged that these entities have wrongfully used the corporate shield of Neways
to avoid liability to Macris. (R. at 7.)
For its causes of action based on the August and September 1992 formation of
and transfer to Neways of Images' assets, including the multilevel marketing business,
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Macris prayed for avoidance of the transfer and monetary damages, including punitive
damages. (R. at 2.)
4.

Neways and the Mowers Admitted that Macris Could Not Have
Asserted Its Current Claims During the Images Action.

Macris could not have brought the causes of action it asserted in the Neways
action in its pleadings filed in the Images action. The transfer of the multilevel
marketing business from Images to Neways occurred on the eve of the first trial setting
in the Images action. (R. at 259, 263.) This was seventeen months after Macris
commenced the Images action and almost three months after Macris filed its last
pleading therein. (R. at 192, 214.) Furthermore, the successor to the multilevel
marketing business, Neways, was never a party to the Images action. Thus, Macris
was unable to assert its causes of action against it.
Neways and the Mowers admitted that Macris could not bring its claims against
them during the Images action. After Macris filed its Complaint in the Neways action
and during the pendency of the Images action, Neways and the Mowers filed a Motion
to Dismiss or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings, contending that Macris' causes of
action against Neways and the Mowers were "Not Ripe for Decision and Therefor [sic]
Should be Dismissed." (R. at 34 (emphasis in original).) Neways and the Mowers
argued:
In the case at bar, [Macris1] claims for Fraudulent Transfer,
Successor Liability and Alter Ego turn first upon a finding that
[Images] has a liability to [Macris]. Since the determination has
not been made, the claims asserted herein have not sharpened
into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations
between the parties and as such, the hypothetical application of
[a rule of law] to a situation in which the parties might, at some
future time, find themselves is unripe for adjudication under the
ripeness d o c t r i n e . . . .
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Further, continuation of this suit, prior to a final
determination of liability in [the Images action] would waste
judicial resources as well as subject the parties to unnecessary
litigation expenses.
(R. at 34 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).) In further support of their motion,
Neways and the Mowers argued that
[Macris'1 claims for breach of contract are against flmages]. At
this time, [Maoris'] right to payment against [Images] is being
considered by this Court. Determination of the merits of [Maoris']
claims will establish if there exists an actual or imminent clash of
legal rights and obligations. It is this determination that will give
rise to any potential claim [Maoris] may have against Neways.
at 51-52 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).)2
5.

In Contradiction to What Images, Neways and the Mowers
Argued and Represented in Both the Images and Neways
Actions, Neways and the Mowers Asserted a Res Judicata
Defense, Arguing that Images and Neways Were in Privity
and Maoris' Claims Could and Should Have Been Brought
in the Images Action.

In stark contrast to the arguments they made in their Motion to Dismiss or
Alternatively Motion to Stay Proceedings, Neways and the Mowers asserted a res
judicata defense in their Amended Answer3 and, on that basis, moved for summary
judgment. (R. at 169, 183.) Instead of arguing that Maoris' fraudulent transfer,
successor liability and alter ego claims were not ripe until after the Images action
ended, Neways and the Mowers did an about face and argued that these claims should
have been brought in the Images action. (R. at 223.)
Also contrary to their prior position, Neways and the Mowers contended that,
"[f]or purposes of [the] motion only, Neways . . . is in privy [sic] with Images." (R. at

2

Neways and the Mowers' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Motion to Stay Proceedings was withdrawn
on July 10, 1995. (R. at 61.)
3
Also in their Amended Answer, however, is the averment that the judgment in the Images action "is not
binding upon these Defendants." (R. at 172.)
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225.) In the Images action, Images and Thomas Mower had emphatically denied any
relationship between Images and Neways. (R. at 262.) This position was critical to
their strategy of attempting to defeat Macris' valid claims by shifting the multilevel
marketing business from Images to Neways. In their motion for summary judgment,
Neways and the Mowers essentially contended that their fervent denials of any
relationship between Neways and Images was a ruse which Macris was required to foil
in the Images action or lose the right to seek redress for the damages suffered from
such gamesmanship.
Neways and the Mowers now present facts that completely contradict their
assertions that Neways was in privity with Images. To prove the privity element of their
res judicata defense to the trial court, Neways and the Mowers admitted that Neways
was the successor to Images: ,f[i]f Neways is a successor in interest of property that is
the subject of pending litigation to which his transferor [Images] is bound then Neways
is entitled to the benefits of res judicata . . . . Images and its alleged successor,
Neways, are thus protected by the doctrine of res judicata." (R. at 224 (quotations
omitted) (alteration in original).) Partly on the basis of this admission, Macris moved for
and the trial court granted summary judgment on Macris' successor liability claim. (R.
at 285, 425, 427-28.) Neways and the Mowers now assert that Neways is not the
successor in interest to Images. In their opening appellate brief, they assert that "Eclat,
Inc. ('Eclat'), not Neways, is the successor company of Images." (Brief of Appellant
at1.)
The variety of Neways and the Mowers' statements regarding the relationship
between Images and Neways and when Macris should have asserted its current claims
highlights the lengths to which they will go to defeat Macris' valid claims and judgment.
While Macris could have possibly amended its pleadings in the Images action to join
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Neways and add its claims against it, Neways and the Mowers insisted that such claims
were not ripe and their assertion during the Images action "would waste judicial
resources as well as subject the parties to unnecessary expense." (R. at 34, 52.)
Following the court's Memorandum Decision in the Images action, however, Neways
and the Mowers asserted that Macris' current claims should have been included in the
Images action. (R. at 223.)
Furthermore, the statements attributable to Neways and the Mowers regarding
the relationship between Neways and Images have now come full circle. In the Images
action, they consistently denied any relationship between Images and Neways so that
they could limit Macris' recovery to damages incurred through August of 1992 and
evade a judgment against Images. (R. at 262.) In the Neways action, their purpose
changed, and so their representations regarding the connection between Images and
Neways changed. They admitted that Neways was the successor to Images to prove
that the two were in privity. (R. at 224.) Moreover, in their Answer and Amended
Answer, Neways and the Mowers admitted that Eclat was merely another name for
Images. (R. at 11, 95, 175.) Now that Macris has moved for and obtained summary
judgment on its successor liability claim, however, Neways and the Mowers revert to
the old ploy of erecting barriers between Images and Neways. Now, "Eclat, Inc.
('Eclat'), not Neways, is the successor company of Images." (Brief of Appellant at 1.)
6.

Despite Neways and the Mowers' Admissions, Inconsistent
Statements and Inequitable Conduct the Trial Court, to a Great
Extent Granted Neways and the Mowers' Motion for Summary
Judgment

Both Neways and the Mowers' and Macris* motions for summary judgment were
orally argued to the trial court on January 22, 1997. (R. at 507, p. 1.) At this hearing,
the attorney for Neways and the Mowers admitted that Macris' causes of action in the
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Images action were different than the causes of action it asserted in the Neways action.
Neways and the Mowers' attorney stated that Macris may present the issue of whether
the Autoqualification Agreement was breached in the Neways action, but the issue of
breach would not arise:
to me, that's a concession that has no meaning because, again, it
won't be before this Court.
The issue that will be before this Court is by virtue of
corporate reorganizations, transfers for consideration^] whether
or not we, Neways, has [sic] assumed that contract by virtue of
the fraudulent conveyance statute, or whether or not it's the same
entity by virtue of some common law theories.
(R. at 396, 507, pp. 23-24.)
Despite this and other admissions and Neways and the Mowers' inconsistencies
regarding Neways' relationship to Images, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision
on September 19, 1997, granting, to a great extent, Neways and the Mowers' motion for
summary judgment. (R. at 422.) Although the trial court found Neways liable for the
judgment against Images in the Images action, it granted Neways and the Mowers'
motion "as to any claim for new damages." (R. at 422.)
The trial court found that the Images and Neways actions arose "from a single
breach of a single contract." (R. at 424-25.) It further found that Macris knew about the
creation of Neways before the conclusion of the previous trial, and should have sought
to include Neways as a party. (R. at 424.) In doing so, the trial court ignored Macris'
argument that its claims and damages asserted in the Neways action arose out of the
August and September 1992 formation of Neways and its succession to Images' assets
and multilevel marketing business, not Images' breach of the Autoqualification
Agreement. (R. at 270, 277, 422-25.) The trial court also ignored Macris' argument
that in the Images action, it was not required to amend its pleadings to include Neways
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and assert wholly different causes of action for fraudulent transfer, successor liability
and alter ego. (R. at 271, 272, 274, 422-25, 507, p. 30.)
With respect to the identity of the parties element of res judicata, the trial court
found that because Neways was a successor to Images, it was entitled to assert res
judicata to the same extent as Images. (R. at 427.) The trial court rejected Macris'
argument that under Utah law, a party may assert the res judicata defense only if the
claims in the prior lawsuit could have been leveled against such party. (R. at 426-27,
507, p. 30, 33.) Because Macris' claims in the Images action could only have been
asserted against Images and its claims in the Neways action could only have been
asserted against Neways, Utah law prohibits their treatment as in privity with each other
for purposes of whether Neways can assert the preclusive effect of the judgment in the
Images action. (R. at 426-27, 507, pp. 30, 33.)
7.

On the Basis of the Uncontroverted Facts Before It the Trial
Court Found that Neways Was Liable to Macris as Images'
Successor.

The trial court did, however, correctly find that Neways was liable as Images'
successor. (R. at 425.) This finding was made mainly on the basis of the unrefuted
facts before the court. The court found that
[i]n early September, 1992, Images transferred substantially all its
assets to Neways, discontinuing its multilevel marketing business,
at which time Neways took over the multilevel marketing
operation, using the same facilities, with the same employees,
selling the same products through essentially the same network
of distributors.
(R. at 431.) These facts were supported by Neways and the Mowers' admissions in the
Amended Answer and were contained in Macris' statement of facts in its Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 8, 10-11, 171, 172, 173, 174,29192.) In responding to Macris' motion, Neways and the Mowers failed to object or
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otherwise attempt to controvert the facts later relied upon by the trial court. (R. at 32324.)
On the basis of these facts, the trial court ruled that, "as Neways consists of
substantially the same assets, products, officers and employees as Images, it would
seem that Neways is in fact a mere continuation of the same corporation" and is
therefore liable as Images' successor. (R. at 425.) Because of its ruling that res
judicata bars Macris' claims for "new damages," however, the trial court limited Neways'
liability to the judgment entered in the Images action. (R. at 422.)
On November 13, 1997, the trial court signed and entered its order partially
granting and denying the parties' motions for summary judgment from which both sides
appeal. (R. at 466-67.) Macris appeals from the part of the order that granted Neways
and the Mowers' motion for summary judgment that any claim by Macris as to new
damages beyond those awarded in the Images action is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. (R. at 490.) Macris also appeals the part of the trial court's order denying its
motion for summary judgment concerning new damages. (R. at 490.) Neways and the
Mowers, on the other hand, appeal the part of the trial court's order holding Neways
liable to Macris for the judgment against Images in the Images action. (R. at 460.)
IX.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court erred in finding that res judicata bars any part of Macris' claims in
this action. First, Macris' fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims in
this action are different from the breach of contract claims it asserted in the Images
action. In order for res judicata to apply, both lawsuits must involve the same cause of
action. The claims in the Neways action are different from the claims in the Images
action because (a) they rest on a different state of facts; (b) they relate to completely
different time periods; (c) they arise out of completely different transactions; (d) they
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rely on completely different rights; (e) they seek redress for completely different wrongs;
(f) a judgment in the Neways action will not impair rights or interests established in the
Images action; and (g) Macris' claims in the Neways action could not have been
asserted in the Images action because such claims required the presence of a different
party.
Second, Macris was not required to amend its pleadings in the Images action to
assert its current claims and join new parties or suffer the loss of such claims. It is
universally held, by both courts and commentators, that the date of filing the pleading
rather than the date of trial or judgment is the controlling date to determine if claims
could and should have been asserted, and plaintiffs need not amend filings to include
issues that arise after the pleadings have been submitted. See citations in Part X.A.2.
Because Macris' fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims did not
arise until after the Images action was commenced and after its last pleading therein—
Neways was not even in existence until after these events—res judicata judicata cannot
bar such claims.
Third, res judicata is inapplicable because Neways was not a party in the Images
action and should not be deemed to have been in privity with Images. Utah law
requires that for a nonparty to assert a judgment entered in a prior action, the party
against whom the judgment is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity in the
prior action to litigate the claims it levels against the nonparty. In this case, Images and
Neways were not in privity because Macris could not have asserted its fraudulent
transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims against Images and therefore did not
have its day in court on such claims in the Images action.
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Finally, the policies of judicial economy, fostering reliance on prior decisions,
preventing inconsistent judgments and avoiding the burden of multiple lawsuits which
support the doctrine of res judicata would not be furthered by its application against
Macris in this case. This Court has ruled that where these policies are not advanced,
res judicata does not apply. In this case, injustice would result from the application of
res judicata. The true cause of the multiple litigation was the fraudulent transfer of
Images' assets and multilevel marketing business to Neways. If Neways and the
Mowers were truly concerned about judicial economy and the avoidance of litigation,
they would not have forced Images to transfer its assets to Neways. Furthermore,
Neways and the Mowers would not have taken their initial position in the Newavs action
that Macris1 current claims were not actionable until the Images action concluded. The
best way to promote the policies underlying the res judicata doctrine is to remand this
action to the trial court to allow Macris to seek damages, including punitive damages,
from Neways and the Mowers for the injuries caused by their attempts to evade liability.
The trial court was correct, however, in imposing liability upon Neways for
Images' obligations to Macris. An entity which acquires the assets of a corporation and
becomes a mere continuation or reincarnation of the corporation's business is liable for
the corporation's debts. In this case, the trial court found, on the basis of the
uncontroverted factual record before it, that Neways consisted of "the same assets,
products, officers, and employees as Images." (R. at 425.) The trial court therefore
correctly held Neways liable for the judgment against Images under the doctrine of
successor liability.
The trial court's only error with respect to its successor liability ruling was in
limiting Neways' liability to the judgment against Images in the Images action. This
limitation was based on the trial court's decision that res judicata barred Macris'
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recovery of damages beyond those awarded in the Images action. For the reasons set
forth in summary above and more particularly below, this decision was incorrect.
X.
A.

ARGUMENT

RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR MACR1S' FRAUDULENT TRANSFER,
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND ALTER EGO CLAIMS AGAINST
NEWAYS AND THE MOWERS.

"In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or
their privies and also the same cause of action." Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d
689, 690 (Utah 1978); see also Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). In addition, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on
the merits. Josephson, 888 P.2d at 677. Res judicata is intended to "foster[ ] reliance
on prior adjudication, prevent[ ] inconsistent decisions, reliev[e] parties of the cost and
vexation of multiple lawsuits, and conserv[e] judicial resources." State in the Interest of
J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Res judicata is an affirmative defense
and the party asserting it bears the burden of proving each and every one of its
elements. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); see Gossner v. Dairymen Assocs., 611 P.2d 713, 717
(Utah 1980).
In this case, res judicata is inapplicable for four reasons. First, Maoris' current
claims did not arise out of the same cause of action at issue in the Images action.
Second, Macris was not required to assert its current claims during the Images action
because those claims did not arise until after the commencement of that action and
after Macris' last pleading therein. Third, Neways should not be deemed to be in privity
with Images because the claims asserted in the Neways action could not be asserted
against Images and the claims asserted in the Images action could not have been
asserted against Neways. Finally, the res judicata doctrine is inapplicable because its
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purposes would go completely unfulfilled in this case and would actually be frustrated.
The trial court therefore erred in holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred any part
of Maoris' claims in this case.4
1.

Macris' Claims in the Newavs Action Are Not Part of the Same
Causes of Action on Which Maoris Prevailed in the Images
Action.

Under Utah law, res judicata may apply only if the causes of action in the current
and previous lawsuits are identical: "'[iln order for res judicata to apply, both suits must
involve . . . the same cause of action.'" Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah
1983) (emphasis in original) (quoting Searle, 588 P.2d at 690); see also Copper State
Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (same). "Where the
claim, demand, or cause of action is different in the two cases, then collateral estoppel
is applicable." \±'} see Searle 588 P.2d at 690; Josephson, 888 P.2d at 677; Berry v.
Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 247-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). If the claims, demands or causes of
action differ in the two actions, the claims in the second action cannot be said to be
ones that could and should have been litigated in the first action. See Schaer, 657
P.2d at 1340 n.2 (ruling that "before the rules enunciated in the Krofcheck [v. Downey
State Bank, 580 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 1978)] case [including that res judicata bars
claims that could and should have been raised in the first action] may be applied, the
appellants must first overcome the threshold determination of whether the claims,
demands or causes of action of both cases are the same."); see also Doe v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1993); Macko v. Byron, 555 F. Supp. 470, 479
(N.D. Ohio 1982); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, comment h (1982); 18
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4406 (1981).

4

Macris does not contend that the Images action did not result in a final judgment on the merits.
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Various tests have been advanced to determine if a cause of action is the same
as one asserted in a prior action. In Schaer v. State, the Utah Supreme Court held that
res judicata was inapplicable where
[t]he two causes of action rest on a different state of facts and
evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain
the two causes of action[, and where] the evidence of the two
causes of action relates to the status of the property in two
completely different time periods.
Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340. Another test asks "what was the critical transaction in each
case" and compares such transactions. Doe, 985 F.2d at 914 (7th Cir. 1993); cX Utah
R. Civ. P. 13(a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim . . . if it arises out of
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's
claim. . . . " ) . Other considerations include:
Is the same right infringed by the same wrong? Would a different
judgment obtained in a second action impair rights under the first
judgment. . . . This court has recognized that the principal test for
comparing causes of action is whether the primary right and duty
or wrong are the same.
Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Julien J.
Studlev. Inc. v. Lefrak, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901, 907-08 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 401 N.E.2d
187 (N.Y. 1979); Peppery. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 152 (Utah 1990);
Nancy's Prod., Inc. v. Fred Meyer, Inc.. 811 P.2d 250, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
Finally, a cause of action must differ from one asserted in a prior action if it
requires a different party for the claimant to obtain relief. Most courts and
commentators maintain that "the claim or cause of action in a suit against one party is
not the same as a claim or cause of action against a different party." 1B James W.
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ^ 0.411[1] (2d ed. 1996); see New Crawford Valley,
Ltd. v. Benedict, 877 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Colo. App. 1993). Thus, it stands to reason that

20

a cause of action which requires the presence of a party not present in the first suit
must be a different cause of action. A similar conclusion was reached by the Colorado
Court of Appeals in Qualitv-Med, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Hospital and Medical Service,
914 P.2d 419 (Colo. App. 1995). There, the court ruled that there was no identity of
claims for relief in the first and second actions because the claims for relief in the first
action could be asserted only against a party not involved in the second action. \_± at
420-21.
In this case, consideration of each and every criterion listed above leads to the
conclusion that Maoris' claims in the Neways action are different from its claims in the
Images action. First, the test applied in Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah
1983), favors finding the claims different. "The two causes of action rest on a different
state of facts and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain the
two causes of action. Moreover, the evidence of the two causes of action relates to . . .
two completely different time periods." j d . The Images action arose out of the 1989
formation and Images' March 7, 1991 breach of the Autoqualification Agreement. In
that action, Macris and Images litigated whether a valid agreement existed between
Macris and Images, whether Images breached that agreement and whether such
breach was excusable or justified.
In contrast, the Neways action arose out of the formation of Neways and Images'
September 1, 1992 transfer of its assets, including the multilevel marketing business, to
the new corporation. This action will deal with the formation of Neways, the relationship
between Images and Neways, the circumstances around which Images' multilevel
marketing business and other assets were transferred to Neways, and Neways'
operation of the multilevel marketing business. As Neways and the Mowers admitted
during the hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the Autoqualification

21

Agreement "won't be before this Court. The issue that will be before this Court is by
virtue of corporate reorganizations, transfers for consideration^] whether or not we,
Neways, has [sic] assumed [liability] by virtue of the fraudulent conveyance statute, or
whether or not it's the same entity by virtue of some common law theories." (R. at 396,
507, pp. 23-24.)
Also, "the critical transaction^] in each case" are different. Doe, 985 F.2d at
914; c/f Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a). In the Images action, the critical transactions were the
1989 establishment of the Autoqualification Agreement as part of the distributorship
agreement and its 1991 breach. In the Neways action, however, the critical
transactions are the formation of Neways and the transfer of Images' assets, including
the multilevel marketing business, to Neways in August and September of 1992. Under
the transactional test, the causes of action in the Images action and the causes of
action in the Neways action are different.
Other considerations also favor a finding that the causes of action are different.
The right asserted in the Images action, the right to rely on a valid contract, is not "[t]he
same right" on which the Neways action was based. See Kemp, 608 F.2d at 1052. In
the Neways action, Macris bases its claims on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and
similar common law doctrines which protect creditors from the "artifices and evasions"
of debtors. See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987).
Also, the wrong for which redress was sought and awarded in the Images action
is not the same wrong for which redress is sought in the instant action. See Kemp, 608
F.2d at 1052. The wrong asserted in the Images action was Images' breach of the
Autoqualification Agreement and distributorship agreement. The wrong asserted in the
Neways action, however, is the fraudulent transfer of, and Neways' succession to, the
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multilevel marketing business and assets of Images accomplished to defeat Maoris'
valid claims and judgment in the Images action.
Furthermore, the two actions are not so similar that a different judgment in the
second action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first. Id.;
see also Pepper, 801 P.2d at 152 (Utah 1990) (holding claim not barred by res judicata
partly because claim "does not constitute a collateral attack on [the prior] order."). The
only rights or interests established in the Images action were Maoris' termination of
Macris' rights to damages flowing from Images' breach of the Autoqualification
Agreement and termination of Macris' distributorship. These rights cannot be impaired
even if the fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims fail. Actually,
Macris' rights and interests established in the Images action would be impaired if its
current claims are barred. If such claims are held to be barred, Images, Neways and
the Mowers' strategy of defeating Macris' valid claims and judgment through evasion
and guile will have succeeded.
Finally, the causes of action in the Images and Neways actions must differ
because Macris could not have obtained relief on its current claims in the Images
action. Rather, the only way Macris can prevail on its fraudulent transfer, successor
liability and alter ego claims is by asserting them against the transferee, the successor
and the alter ego, Neways; not the empty shell of Images. Because Neways was not a
party in the Images action, these claims could not have been asserted. Thus, they are
different from the breach of contract claims that actually were asserted.
This same conclusion regarding the identity of breach of contract claims and
later arising fraudulent transfer and successor liability claims has been reached by other
courts. For example, in Magic Valley Radiology v. Kolouch, 849 P.2d 107 (Idaho 1993),
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the Idaho Supreme Court held that a judgment on a plaintiffs breach of contract cause
of action did not bar the plaintiffs fraudulent transfer, director liability and successor
liability claims:
None of these claims arise out of the transaction that was the
subject of [the prior lawsuits]. These claims address transactions
that are alleged to have occurred after the alleged breach of the
contractual arrangement that was the subject of the first c a s e . . . .
[I]t is clear that the issues raised by [the plaintiffs] claims for
fraudulent transfers, for director liability, and for continuation of
business, were not decided in the prior case. That case focused
on the conduct of [the defendants] in breaching the contractual
arrangement....
IdL at 112.
In Julien J. Studlev. Inc. v. Lefrak. 412 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 401
N.E.2d 187 (N.Y. 1979), the New York courts held that the plaintiffs prior breach of
contract action against the defendant did not bar its later suit against the defendant for
fraudulent transfer:
The prior litigation established the debts owing to [the plaintiff]
from the corporations . . . .
In this litigation the enforcement of the judgments against
corporate assets is the issue, and [the defendant] is sued
because he is one of the transferees of those corporate assets.
Hence, the gist of the two litigations is not the same and, clearly,
the claims of the parties rest on different aspects of the
transactions between the corporations and [the defendant].
Though in the first action [the plaintiff] could have sought to
establish its debt and set aside the transfer at once, it chose not
to do so, and it may not be faulted for the choice. The judgment
in this litigation will not "destroy or impair rights or interests
established by the first."
Id. at 904, 907-08 (emphasis added) (quoting Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberq Realty
Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 307); Lefrak. 401 N.E.2d at 188.
Like the fraudulent transfer and successor liability claims in Magic Valley
Radiology and Lefrak, Maoris' claims in the Newavs action did not arise out of the
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breach of contract causes of action asserted in the Images action. The gist of the two
litigations is not the same, and therefore res judicata is inapplicable.
In their opening brief, Neways and the Mowers argue that Maoris1 successor
liability claim should have been asserted in the Images action because "if a plaintiff has
knowledge of the facts to support a claim against a defendant or the defendant's privy,
the doctrine [of] res judicata requires that the plaintiff bring these claims in the existing
action." (Brief of Appellant at 14.) Neways and the Mowers could not be more wrong.
The doctrine of res judicata does not impose upon plaintiffs a rule
requiring the mandatory joinder of claims. The doctrine merely
calls upon a party to present all of his proof and assert all of his
theories of recovery . . . when litigating a claim, as he will be
prevented from doing so thereafter. The doctrine does not, as
defendants assert, require a plaintiff to join in one action all of the
separate causes of action which he may have against a particular
defendant.
Macko, 555 F. Supp. at 479 (emphasis added); see also Doe, 985 F.2d at 931 ("[EJven
if a plaintiff is aware of the factual basis for a suit at the filing of another suit, he or she
is not obligated to bring all claims together if they do not arise out of the same
transaction."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, comment h (1982) ("There is
no . . . compulsion on a plaintiff who has a number of claims against a defendant to join
them in a single action; he may join them if he wishes, but he is not obliged to do so out
of fear that he will lose any claims he omits to join. Joinder of multiple claims is
permissive, not compulsory."); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4406 (1981) (same). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that
before consideration of whether subsequent claims could and should have been raised
in a prior action, "the appellants must first overcome the threshold determination of
whether the claims, demands or causes of action of both cases are the same." Schaer,
657 P.2d at 1340 n.2; Krofcheck. 580 P.2d at 244.
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Despite Neways and the Mowers1 assertions, Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), does not stand for a contrary rule. In Masters v. Worslev, the first
action was a divorce proceeding in which Worsley was awarded custody of the children,
and Masters was ordered to pay child support. During that action, Worsley falsely
denied having had an amorous affair during the marriage. Following such false denial,
Masters discovered the truth of the matter and that some of the children may have been
fathered by Worsley's paramour. Masters filed an action for fraud, challenging the
divorce court's award of child support. \_± at 500, 501.
Despite the fact that a challenge to the obligation of child support was or could
have been litigated in the divorce proceeding, this Court found that res judicata, or
claim preclusion, was inapplicable. ]cL at 509. The Court's basis for this holding was
not, as argued by Neways and the Mowers, solely that Masters had no knowledge of
the facts supporting the fraud claim. This Court also found that the issues surrounding
the fraud action were different from the issues litigated in the divorce proceedings:
"Claim preclusion does not bar Masters's fraud claim because the issues have not been
fully litigated in either the original divorce nor the petition for modification proceedings."
Id. at 503. Masters v. Worslev is yet another case in a long line of Utah decisions
holding that res judicata does not preclude a cause of action that is different from one
asserted in a prior suit. Thus, it is not true, as Neways and the Mowers assert, that
Macris was required to assert each and every separate cause of action it had during the
Images action. As discussed above, Macris' claims in the Neways action are different
from its claims in the Images action, and res judicata therefore cannot apply.
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2.

Macris Was Not Required to Amend Its Complaint in the
Images Action to Assert Its Current Claims Because Such
Claims Did Not Arise Until After the Commencement of that
Action and After Macris' Last Pleading Therein.

In order for res judicata to preclude the assertion of a subsequent cause of
action, not only must the cause of action be identical to one brought in the prior suit, but
the party sought to be barred must also have been aware of the cause of action at the
time the first suit was commenced or the filing of the party's last pleading therein.
Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 1993); Manning v. City of Auburn,
953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992); Prime Management Co., Inc. v. Steinegger, 904
F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1990); Balderman v. United States Veterans Admin., 870 F.2d
57, 62 (2d Cir. 1989); Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas Joint Venture, 835
F.2d 1329, 1336 (10th Cir. 1988); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985);
Green v. Illinois Dept. of Transp.. 609 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (N.D. III. 1985); Whitley
Constr. Co. v. Whitley, 213 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Bolte v. Aits, Inc., 587
P.2d 810, 812-13 (Haw. 1978); Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 903 P.2d 147,
149 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); Whitaker v. Bank of Newport, 836 P.2d 695, 699 (Or. 1992)
(in banc); Ben C. Jones & Co. v. Gammel-Statesman Publishing Co.. 99 S.W. 701, 703
(Tex. 1907); Kaiser v. Northwest Shopping Ctr., Inc., 587 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. App.
1979); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, comment d (1982); 18 Charles A.
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4409 (1981). The rule has been stated
as follows:
[W]e do not believe that the res judicata preclusion of claims that
"could have been brought" in earlier litigation includes claims
which arise after the original pleading is filed in the earlier
litigation. Instead we believe that, for res judicata purposes,
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claims that "could have been brought" are claims in existence at
the time the original complaint is filed or claims actually asserted
by supplemental pleadings or otherwise in the earlier action.
Manning, 953 F.2d at 1360 (emphasis in original); see also Whitaker, 836 P.2d at 699
("Obviously, enough events to give rise to the second claim must have occurred before
the first claim is brought so that the party against whom preclusion is asserted could
have combined his or her claims with the earlier ones." (emphasis in original)); Kaiser
587 S.W.2d at 457 ("[T]he date of filing the pleading rather than the date of trial or
judgment is controlling."); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4409 (1981) ("The rules that expand the dimensions of a cause of action as time goes
on require clear identification of a stopping point. Most cases assume that an action
need only include the portions of the claim due at the time of commencing that action.")
Thus, "plaintiffs need not amend filings to include issues that arise after the original suit
is lodged." Doe, 985 F.2d at 915; see also Whitley, 213 S.E.2d at 911 ("The fact that
[procedural rules] contain[ ] liberal provisions making it possible to amend the pleadings
during the course of the trial [does] not require the plaintiff to so amend in every case in
which he might amend. . . . It is more practicable to have a certain cutoff time
(emphases in original)).
The Utah Supreme Court adopted this rule long ago in Badger v. Badger, 254 P.
784, 787 (Utah 1927). In that case, the defendant twice petitioned for a modification of
a decree of divorce. Her first petition sought modification on the ground that the
property settlement on which the decree was based was induced by the plaintiffs false
representations and omissions regarding his assets. The court modified the decree,
ordering plaintiff to pay the defendant an additional amount. The defendant filed her
second petition alleging that the plaintiff further misrepresented his assets. The plaintiff
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moved to strike the petition on the grounds that the court's decision on the defendant's
first petition barred relief on her second, and the trial court granted the motion. kL at
785-86.
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the court recited the general rule against
splitting one's cause of action: " I f . . . the pleader is in possession of the means of
ascertaining the full extent of his claim, and his failure to do so is due to his own fault or
neglect, it would seem that upon both principle and authority the general rule against
splitting applies." jcL at 787. In its analysis, however, the court made clear that for res
judicata to apply, the pleader must have the ability to ascertain the full extent of his
claim "at the time the first petition was filed." Id. (emphasis added). The court found
that the general rule against claim splitting applied because
[i]t affirmatively is made to appear that at the time the first petition
was filed for a modification of the decree of divorce the defendant
knew the contents of said decree and that she was to receive no
property except that actually awarded to her. . . . [T]he
[defendant] had as much knowledge about the plaintiffs property
and income at the time she filed her first petition as she had at
the time she filed the amended petition which was stricken.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court also emphasized that "[n]owhere in the amended
petition is there any allegation to the effect that she was not fully advised of matters
complained of by her in such amended petition at the time she filed her first petition for
an amendment of the decree of divorce." kL at 786, 787 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Utah Supreme Court has decided that an action need include only the portions of a
cause of action that have arisen at the time that action was commenced. \j± at 786,
787.
This rule is echoed in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13(a) defines a
counterclaim that must be asserted or be barred in another action as "any claim which
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at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) (emphasis added). Thus, Utah law treats the time that the earlier
suit was commenced or the filing of the party's last pleading therein as the time by
which to determine if the party could and should have asserted a claim in that suit.
Contrary to Neways and the Mowers' contentions, Ringwood v. Foreign Auto
Works, Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), does not stand for the proposition
that if a plaintiff learns of facts after the commencement of an action that give rise to a
claim, he is required to amend his pleadings to assert such claim. In Ringwood, the
plaintiff was barred from bringing a second action on a claim for breach of contract that
arose before the first action was commenced. The plaintiff filed his first lawsuit on
January 29, 1980, claiming the defendants had breached an October 1978 promissory
note. kL at 1353. Because the plaintiff did not base his claim on a November 8, 1978
agreement, which the court found controlling, the court dismissed his claim, i d The
second action asserted breach of the November 8, 1978 agreement. JdL Because
plaintiff knew of the November 8, 1978 agreement and the breach before his
January 29, 1980 lawsuit, his second action was dismissed. \± at 1358. Thus, nothing
in this case runs contrary to the rule adopted in Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Badger v. Badger, and the majority of cases and commentators that an
action need include onJy the portions of a cause of action that have arisen at the time
the action was commenced or at the time of the party's last pleading in that action.
This rule is grounded in good sense. Any alternative time for evaluating whether
a claim is precluded could lead to unfairness.
Substantial disruption could result from forced amendment at any
time after significant discovery has been accomplished, and it is
hard to justify any test relating to the progress of discovery or
other pretrial events so clear that plaintiffs could afford to apply it
without seeking explicit judicial guidance.
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18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4409 (1981); see also
Doe, 985 F.2d at 915 ("We would twist res judicata grotesquely out of shape by holding
that a plaintiff must include not only all claims arising from the same transaction, but
must anticipate future harms . . .); Manning, 953 F.2d at 1360 (holding that the rule that
a lawsuit need only include claims that have arisen at time of commencement "avoids
the 'potentially unworkable requirement that every claim arising prior to entry of a final
decree must be brought into the pending litigation or lost.'" (quoting Los Angeles
Branch NAACP. 750 F.2d at 739 n.9).
In this case, the trial court erred by dismissing Maoris' fraudulent transfer,
successor liability and alter ego claims for relief beyond that awarded in the Images
action because such claims arose after the commencement of the Images action and
after Macris' last pleadings therein. Macris commenced the Images action on April 17,
1991. On June 9, 1992, Macris filed its Second Amended Complaint, its last pleading
in that suit. It is uncontroverted that Neways did not even exist before August of 1992,
and Images' assets, including the multilevel marketing business, were transferred to
Neways in September, 1992. Until these events, Macris could not assert its current
claims. Even then, Macris would require time to discover the totality of facts giving rise
to the fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims. As the Idaho Court of
Appeals explained with respect to a similar type of claim:
it is not enough that a party knows it might have a basis to sue
to pierce the corporate veil at the time it brings an action against
a corporation. Any time a party conducts business with a closely
held corporation, that party is aware that the corporate principal
with whom the party deals might be the alter ego of that
corporation. Such knowledge is insufficient, however, for res
judicata to bar that party from bringing a subsequent action to
pierce the corporate veil.
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Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 903 P.2d 147, 150 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (citing
Idaho R. Civ. P. 11 which requires that "a pleading be well grounded in fact" and stating
that under Rule 11 "mere 'suspicion,' 'without factual foundation' is not a sufficient basis
to sue an individual."); Whitley Constr. Co.. 213 S.E.2d at 911 ("[l]t must also be
remembered that [a new claim] also requires the requisite p r o o f . . . . It is more
practicable to have a certain cutoff time . . . ."). Thus, even after Neways' formation and
succession to Images' business and assets, Macris' current claims were not
immediately ripe for assertion. Because Macris was not required to amend its
pleadings in the Images action to include the new claims or suffer their loss, the trial
court erred in holding them barred by res judicata.
3.

For Res Judicata Purposes, Neways Should Not Be Deemed
to Be in Privity with Images: Macris Did Not Have a Full and
Fair Opportunity in the Images Action to Litigate Its Current
Claims Because Such Claims Could Not Be Asserted Against
Images.

It is undisputed that for res judicata to apply in this case, Neways must be
deemed Images' privy because it was not a party in the Images action. (Brief of
Appellant at 9.) The concept of privity, however, has never been precisely defined.
Various courts have commented that "[pjrivity is essentially a conclusory term that
describes the relationship between a party and a non-party that is deemed close
enough to warrant the application of claim or issue preclusion to the non-party." Ditton
v. Bowerman. 844 P.2d 919, 922 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Motion Picture Indus. Pension
Plan v. Hawaii Kona Coast Assocs., 823 P.2d 752, 757 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991) ("The
concept of privity has moved . . . to merely a word used to say that the relationship
between the one who is a party of record and another is close enough to include that
other within the res ajudicata [sic]." (internal quotes omitted)). What is clear is that the

32

privity concept is inextricably connected with the basic concern that "[t]he party barred
from litigating a claim in a subsequent action must have had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the same claim in the prior case." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.,
913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure §4448 (1982).
This concept is embodied in the Utah Supreme Court's and this Court's
discussions of the identity of parties requirement of res judicata and the concept of
privity. In International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979), the court
stated that the identity of parties requirement of res judicata was founded on the
concept that those barred by a prior action must have had an opportunity to assert its
claims in that action:
One of the reasons that it is said that the parties must have been
the same in both actions is that before the rights of a party are
concluded by a judgment, he is entitled to due process of law and
an opportunity to contest the issue if he so desires.
Id. at 517. Also, in determining whether an entity should be deemed in privity with a
party for res judicata purposes, Utah courts "resolve[ ] all doubts in favor of permitting
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." Baxter v. Utah Dept.
ofTransp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 1985); Ruffinenqo v. Miller. 579 P.2d 342, 344
(Utah 1978). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has held that those whose only
connections with previous actions were as witnesses or were shared legal rights with
those who were parties are not in privity with parties to such action. Baxter, 705 P.2d at
1169; Ruffinenqo, 579 P.2d at 344. This is also why the Utah Supreme Court has
defined a person in privity as a representative of a party: "a person so identified in
interest with another that he represents the same legal right." Searle Bros, v. Searle,
588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). The "ability to control representation of rights is
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'necessary to fulfill the function of privity to provide a day in court."' State in the Interest
ofT.J., 945 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Ruscetta. 742 P.2d
114, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
Viewed in light of its '"function . . . to provide a day in court,"1 j d , it is apparent
that the test of privity depends on whether a nonparty is sought to be bound by a
previous judgment or whether the nonparty is seeking to take advantage of it.
The question whether a nonparty may take advantage of a
judgment is now approached by most courts from a very different
perspective than the question whether a party may be bound.. . .
Once it is concluded that preclusion is asserted against a person
who may be bound by the judgment, the inquiry shifts to ask
whether there is some special reason for denying its benefits to a
nonparty. Denial is most likely to rest on a broad conclusion that
the first litigation did not afford a "full and fair opportunity" to try
the issue offered for preclusion.
18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4448 (1982). When the
issue is whether a nonparty should be bound as one in privity, the test is whether it had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior action by virtue of some
control or representation in that action. Baxter, 705 P.2d at 1169; Ruffinengo, 579 P.2d
at 344; State in Interest of T.J., 945 P.2d at 162-63; Ruscetta, 742 P.2d at 117.
Moreover, the analysis is performed irrespective of whether the nonparty had the
opportunity to intervene in the prior action. Searle Bros., 588 P.2d at 692 ("The right to
intervene as a party in the prior suit does not bind the party in the subsequent suit
where he failed to so intervene.").
The test of privity to determine if a nonparty may take advantage of a prior
judgment and preclude a party must also be applied with a view of "resolving doubts in
favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy."
Ruffinengo, 579 P.2d at 344. Therefore, the test of privity in this situation is whether
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the party "had the 'full and fair opportunity' it is entitled to for an adjudication" on its later
asserted claims. Dunfield, 599 P.2d at 517; see also Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913
P.2d at 733; Gossner v. Dairymen Assocs., 611 P.2d 713, 716-17 (Utah 1980).
Moreover, just as a nonparty is not required to intervene, the "identity of parties"
analysis with respect to whether a nonparty may take advantage of a judgment must be
applied irrespective of whether the party could have amended its pleadings to join the
nonparty. Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc., 743 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Utah 1987)
(rejecting argument that "res judicata should bar plaintiffs suit against respondent
because plaintiff could have amended her complaint in the original action to join
respondent as a defendant. Plaintiffs failure . . . cannot bar the action."); Gossner, 611
P.2d at 716-17, 719 (rejecting dissent's argument that the identity of parties prong of
res judicata is met because in the original action, the nonparty should have been
joined). Thus, before a nonparty can assert the preclusive effect of a prior judgment,
the party must have had its day in court on the merits of the claims against the nonparty
even though the nonparty was not present.
In this case, a nonparty, Neways, seeks to take advantage of the judgment in
Maoris' favor in the Images action. Therefore, to ensure that Macris has had its day in
court on its fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims, the test of privity
is whether Macris had a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims during the
Images action. In other words, when Macris litigated its claims against Images in the
Images action, it must have also been litigating its fraudulent transfer, successor liability
and alter ego claims. Clearly, Macris did not. Such claims can only be asserted
against the transferee, the successor and the alter ego, Neways. Because Macris has
not had its day in court with respect to these claims, Neways must not be held to be in
privity with Images, and the trial court erred in holding that it was.
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The trial court's privity analysis deprived Macris of a full and fair opportunity to
litigate its current claims. First, the trial court found that if "Neways is a successor in
interest of property that is the subject of pending litigation to which his transferor is
bound then the transferee is" in privity with the transferor. (R. at 427.) Then, the trial
court held that "as Neways is the successor in interest of property that Images would
have used to pay damages to Macris, Neways is entitled to argue res judicata to the
same extent as Images." (R. at 427.) The problem with the trial court's analysis is that
it applied an inapplicable test of privity and then skewed the test to reach its result.
The test applied by the trial court is inapplicable because property was not the
subject of the litigation in the Images action. The subject of the Images action was the
formation of the Autoqualification Agreement and Images' breach of that contract. The
fact that, as the trial court reasoned, property "would have [been] used to pay damages
to Macris" does not make it the subject of the Images action. Otherwise, every action
for damages becomes a property dispute.
The purpose of this test of privity makes clear that it would be unfair to apply it in
this case. In the case of a nonparty successor to property seeking to take advantage of
a prior judgment, the purpose is to provide repose with respect to the adjudicated status
of property. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1980). In such a case,
preclusion is justified because the claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
status of the property. In the case of a nonparty successor who is sought to be bound
by a prior judgment
[t]he compelling need for this rule is apparent. To deny
preclusion would be to deny the victor any assurance of repose
and expose every judgment to defeat by simple conveyance.
18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4462 (1981); see also
Golden State Bottling Co.. Inc. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973) ("We hold that a
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bona fide purchaser, acquiring, with knowledge that the wrong remains unremedied, the
employing enterprise which was the locus of the unfair labor practice, may be
considered in privity with its predecessor. . . ."). In this case, the Images action was
unconcerned with the status of property, and it would be unfair to preclude Macris from
asserting completely different claims as if the Images action had been concerned with
the status of property. Macris has not had its day in court on its current claims.
Moreover, the test applied in this case would defeat its dual purpose to prevent the type
of evasion perpetrated by Neways and the Mowers in this case. Thus, the trial court
erred in applying a successive property interest test of privity and finding that, under
such test, Neways was in privity with Images.5
4.

Res Judicata Is Inapplicable in this Case Because the Policies
Underlying the Res Judicata Doctrine Would Not Be Furthered,
and Would Actually Be Frustrated.

The purposes of res judicata are defined as "fostering reliance on prior
adjudications], preventing inconsistent decisions, relieving parties of the cost and
vexation of multiple lawsuits and conserving judicial resources." State in the Interest of
J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotations omitted). In Estate v.
Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 910 P.2d
425 (Utah 1995), this Court held that if these justifications are not present in an action
"neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel precludes the . . . action." \_± at 678.
Furthermore, res judicata is an equitable doctrine, and it should not be applied where it

5

The trial court also erred in assuming, without any basis or argument from Neways or the Mowers, that
Thomas and Leslie Mower were in privity with Images. "[F]or purposes of the doctrine of res judicata, a
corporation is treated as a legal entity separate from and independent of its officers, directors and
stockholders. Therefore, a judgment against a corporation will not preclude the assertion of claims
against that corporation's directors [or stockholders]. . . ." New Crawford Valley, Ltd. v. Benedict, 877
P.2d 1363, 1368 (Colo. App. 1993); Ditton v. Bowerman, 844 P.2d 919, 922 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Durrant
v. Quality First Mktg, Inc., 903 P.2d 147, 149-50 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992).
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would be inequitable to do so. Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 630 F.2d
864, 875 (1st Cir. 1980); Sweetheart Plastics v. Illinois Tool Works. 439 F.2d 871 (1st
Cir. 1971); Boltev. Aits. Inc., 587 P.2d 810, 814 (Haw. 1978); Pepper v. Zions First
Nat'l Bank. N.A.. 801 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 1990); 1B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice fl 0.405[12] (1996). This is especially so where the issue is whether the
plaintiff, which prevailed in the prior suit, is attempting to split its cause of action rather
than relitigate it. Bolte. 587 P.2d at 814 ("The rule against splitting should not be so
rigidly applied . . . to produce injustice and thwart the policy upon which it was founded."
1B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ]J 0.405[12] ("In cases involving the
splitting of a cause of action, there is a certain amount of flexibility . . . and the decisions
in this context show, perhaps, less rigidity.")
First, application of res judicata in this case would not foster reliance on the
adjudication of the images action. To the contrary, application of res judicata would
defeat such reliance. In the Images action, Macris prevailed on its breach of contract
causes of action and was awarded a substantial sum. If res judicata is applied in this
case, Neways and the Mowers' artifice and evasion will defeat Macris' judgment as well
as other damages Macris suffered as a result of their fraud. Thus, in order to foster
reliance on the adjudication in the Images action, this Court should hold res judicata
inapplicable and allow Macris to enforce its judgment and seek its damages from
Neways and the Mowers.
Also, application of res judicata is not necessary to prevent inconsistent
decisions. Macris prevailed in the Images action. The only rights or interests
established in that suit were Macris' right to relief stemming from Images' breach of the
Autoqualification Agreement. These rights cannot be impaired even if Macris'
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fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims fail. The rights and interests
established in the Images action can only be impaired if Macris is precluded from
enforcing its judgment and asserting its claims against Neways and the Mowers for
attempting to evade liability.
Third, it is not Macris' conduct that has forced the parties to incur the cost and
vexation of multiple lawsuits. That dubious distinction belongs solely to Neways and
the Mowers. Neways and the Mowers forced Macris to bring its claims against them by
causing Images to transfer its assets, including the multilevel marketing business, to
Neways. Furthermore, Neways and the Mowers initially took the position in this suit
that Macris' current claims were not ripe until the first suit was concluded. They took
this position while the Images action was still pending and when an amendment of
Macris' pleading may have been possible. If Neways and the Mowers were truly
concerned about the cost and burden of multiple litigation, they should not have
attempted to defeat the judgment and Macris' claims in the Images action and should
not have taken the position that Macris' current claims were not ripe until the Images
action concluded.
In the Images action, Macris did not pursue only part of its claims. Rather,
Macris sought all "damages resulting from termination of the automatic qualification
status and of the distributorship." (R. at 192-97.) The rule against splitting a cause of
action should not apply where a claimant pursued all the relief to which it was entitled.
The rule against splitting a cause of action is based on the
salutary policy of preventing a multiplicity of vexatious
lawsuits and harassment of the defendant. The rule
presupposes the fact that the plaintiff is consciously acting
inequitably in suing for only part of his claim, knowing that
he was unnecessarily bringing vexatious lawsuits against
the defendant or careless as to whether he was causing
such vexation. The rule against splitting should not be so
rigidly applied, however, to produce an injustice and thwart
the policy on which it was founded. Thus, where the
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plaintiff is . . . not negligent or [the necessity of a
subsequent action] was caused by the fraud or fault of the
defendant, plaintiffs purpose will not be to consciously and
unreasonably vex or harass the defendant. . . .
Consequently, the rationale and rule against splitting a
cause of action will be inapplicable.
Bolte, 587 P.2d at 814. Because in the Images action Macris was not consciously or
carelessly suing for only part of its claim, the rule against claim splitting should not
apply.
Finally, if anyone has caused a waste of judicial resources in this case, it is
Neways and the Mowers, not Macris. After Images transferred its assets to Neways,
Images and Thomas Mower made every effort to erect a wall between Images and
Neways. Images and Mr. Mower consistently maintained that Images and Neways
were wholly separate corporations having little or no relationship. Furthermore, when it
was still possible for Macris to bring its current claims and join Neways in the Images
action, Neways and the Mowers took the position that such claims were not actionable
until the Images action ended. Macris should therefore not be faulted for bringing its
claims against Neways and the Mowers in a separate action. Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
985 F.2d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A] critical piece of the puzzle [giving rise to
plaintiffs later asserted claims] was [defendant's] change of tactics during the lawsuit.
Without this information, [plaintiff] could not have known that she had a claim."); Pepper
v. Zions First Natl Bank. N A . 801 P.2d 144, 148-49 (Utah 1990) ("Where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, . . . a new suit may be sustained. . . .");
Estate of Covington, 888 P.2d at 678 (holding that party was not barred by res judicata
when in prior action it relied on opponent's representations that if true would have made
further litigation unnecessary).
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Neways and the Mowers' argument in their brief that Maoris' failure to
assert its current claims in the Images action has led to a waste of judicial
resources and unnecessary expense cannot be taken seriously. (Brief of
Appellant at 16.) In this very case, they also argued that judicial resources and
funds would be wasted if Macris could bring their current claims during the
Images action:
continuation of this suit, prior to a final determination of liability in
[the Images action] would waste judicial resources as well as
subject the parties to unnecessary litigation expenses.
(R. at 34 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).) Such inconsistency is illustrative of
Neways and the Mowers' litigation strategy which itself is the sole cause of
unnecessary litigation expense and waste of judicial resources.
Judicial economy and the other policies underlying the res judicata doctrine
should not be obtained at the price of injustice. The best way to promote the purposes
underlying res judicata is to remand this case to the trial court and allow Macris the
opportunity to seek damages from Neways and the Mowers for the additional injuries
caused by their attempts to evade liability, including punitive damages for intentional
and fraudulent transfers.

B.

ON THE BASIS OF THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS BEFORE IT, THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT NEWAYS WAS LIABLE TO
MACRIS AS IMAGES' SUCCESSOR.

An entity which acquires the assets of a corporation will become liable for the
debts of the transferor
"when the circumstances surrounding the transaction show that
the new corporation was created for the purpose of succeeding
to the business and acquiring the property of the old corporation
and the manner of acquiring the business and property and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction are of such a
character as to warrant the conclusion that it is a mere
continuation of the former corporation."
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B&K Distr.. fnc. v. Drake BuiMnq Corp., 654 P.2d 324, 326 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)
(quoting Oklahoma Title Co. v. Burrus, 44 P.2d 852 (Okla. 1935)); see also R. at 426
('"Under some circumstances, the transferee may be held liable for the debts of the
transferor, to wit: .. . where the transferee corporation was a mere continuation or
reincarnation of the old corporation.'" (quoting Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Similarity
of Ownership or Control as Basis for Charging Corporation Acquiring Assets of Another
with Liability for Former Owner's Debt, 49 A.LR. 881, 883 (1973)).
In this case, the trial court correctly held Neways liable as Images' successor. In
August, 1992, Neways was incorporated with Thomas Mower as president and his wife,
Les//e Mower, as vice president Thomas Mower was the founder and president of
Images. In fact, Neways' officers, directors and shareholders were the same members
of the Mowers' family who were also the officers, directors and shareholders of Images.
On the eve of the first trial setting in the Images action, the newly formed Neways
succeeded to Images' assets, including the multilevel marketing business, all of Images'
inventory and all of its tangible assets. All of the distributors in the multilevel marketing
business, with the exception of Macris, were invited to become distributors of the
business under Neways with the same rank and position. Furthermore, Neways carried
on the same business as Images using the same facilities, employees, equipment,
furnishings and product formulations that Images had used the day before the transfer.
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court was correct in ruling that "as Neways
consists of substantially the same assets, products, officers, and employees as Images,
it would seem that Neways is in fact a mere continuation of the same corporation" and
Neways is liable to Macris as Images' successor. (R. at 425.)
The trial court's only error with respect to its holding of successor liability was in
limiting Neways' liability to the judgment against Images in the Images action on the
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basis of res judicata. As discussed above, res judicata does not apply to any part of
Maoris' claims for relief. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's holding that
Neways is liable as Images' successor but reverse the trial court's order to the extent it
limits Neways' successor liability to the judgment against Images.
Neways and the Mowers raise a number of arguments in opposition to the trial
court's finding of successor liability. Each lacks merit.
First, Neways and the Mowers contend that res judicata bars Maoris' successor
liability claims. For the reasons stated in the preceding sections of this brief, res
judicata does not bar any of Macris' claims, including its successor liability claim for
relief. Moreover, res judicata is especially inapplicable where a party seeks to enforce
a judgment against a different party. See New Crawford Valley, Ltd. v. Benedict, 877
P.2d 1363, 1367-68 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); see also Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and
Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48,
51 (7th Cir. 1995) ("But a second chance is precisely the point of successor
liability. . . ."); Julien J. Studlev, Inc. v. Lefrak, 401 N.E.2d 187, 188 (N.Y. 1979) ("[T]he
legislatively sanctioned enforcement proceeding contemplates a pre-existing
judgment.").
Also, Neways and the Mowers assert that "Neways did not contractually agree to
succeed to Images' obligation to Macris." (Brief of Appellant at 18.) The trial court,
however, did not base its ruling on any contractual agreement. Rather it based its
judgment on the ground that Neways is a mere continuation of Images' business. This
ground is entirely adequate to sustain the trial court's finding of successor liability.
Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991); Koch
v. Speedwell Motor Car Co., 140 P. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914), modified, 140 P. 600
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(Cal. Ct. App. 1914); Rj*K Distr., 654 P.2d at 326; Steel Co. v. Morgan Marshall Indus.
662 N.E.2d 595, 599 (III- App. Ct. 1996); Tinio, supra, 49 A.L.R. at 883.
This Court's decisions in Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Co., Inc..
888 P.2d 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), do not stand for a contrary rule. Neither of these decisions dealt
with whether a transferee was liable for the debts of a transferor because it succeeded
to the business of the transferor. These cases are therefore inapposite.
Next, Neways arid the Mowers contend, for the first time on appeal, that Eclat,
Inc. is Images' true successor and the trial court failed to consider evidence as to
whether Images or Ecl^t could satisfy the obligation to Macris. (Brief of Appellant at
19.) Neways and the Mowers should not be allowed to now present evidence that was
not before the trial court regarding Eclat, Inc. A party may not raise a factual issue for
the first time on appeal Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1983).
Furthermore, Neways and the Mowers' new contentions are contrary to
uncontested facts. In both their Answer and Amended Answer, Neways and the
Mowers admitted that £clat is simply another name for Images. Also, it is
uncontroverted that Images transferred its multilevel marketing business, its inventory
and all of its tangible assets to Neways. Thus, Eclat Inc. could not be the true
successor of Images.
Also, the trial court most certainly did consider evidence as to whether Images
could satisfy its obligations to Macris. Following the transfer of assets to Neways,
Images had no remaining tangible assets. Furthermore, Neways and the Mowers now
assert that "[t]he remainder of the assets and liabilities were transferred to another
corporation known as £clat." (Brief of Appellant at 3.) Thus, by their own assertions,
Images had absolutely no assets to satisfy any judgment or obligation.
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Neways and the Mowers also argue that the evidence does not support the trial
court's finding that Neways consists of substantially the same assets, products, officers
and employees as Images. This argument is another attempt to raise factual issues for
the first time on appeal. These facts were supported by Neways and the Mowers'
admissions in their Amended Answer and in Macris' statement of facts in its
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. In responding to Macris'
motion, Neways and the Mowers failed to object or attempt to dispute the facts listed in
support of Macris' motion. "Thus, because the appellant. . . failed to proffer any
evidence at the trial level in contradiction to the plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, [the appellant] will not be permitted to now raise the issue for the first time
on appeal." Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1342; see Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr., Inc.,
761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Finally, Neways and the Mowers argue that a corporation must purchase all
assets of the old corporation in order to be the successor corporation. (Brief of
Appellant at 20.) This argument is not only wrong, it is ridiculous. Purchase of
substantially all the assets of the predecessor is all that is required. Williams v.
Bowman Livestock Equip. Co.. 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991); B&KDistr., Inc.,
654 P.2d at 326. The rule advanced by Neways and the Mowers could lead to illogical
and unfair results if, for instance, only a minuscule amount of assets remain with the
transferor. Successor liability could too easily be defeated by such a tactic. C i , Utah
Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2) (directing that "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any
creditor" may be inferred from "transfer. . . of substantially all the debtor's assets"
(emphasis added)).
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Because the trial court had ample uncontroverted evidence before it that Neways
was a mere continuation of Images' business, this Court should affirm its imposition of
successor liability upon Neways.
XL

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Neways and the Mowers and affirm the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Macris. Res judicata is not applicable to bar Macris' claims against
Neways and the Mowers for damages beyond those awarded in the Images action. In
addition, although the trial court correctly found that Neways was liable to Macris as
Images' successor, the trial court erred in limiting such liability to the judgment entered
in the Images action.
DATED:

May 14, 1998.
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

T
D. Frank Wilklns
T"'
P*^
v
**-'
Chris R. Hoale
Hogle
Attorneys for Macris & Associates, Inc.
50 South Main, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on May 14, 1998, two true and correct copies of the
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC. were mailed via first
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Allen K. Davis
150 East 400 North
Salem, Utah 84653
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County, State of Utah
CARMA B.SMITH, Clerk'

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T x ^ X ^ / f ^ g
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
7
)" ~ e W
MEMORANDUM DECISION

MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 950400093CN
vs.

DATE: September 19, 1997

NEW AYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER,
and LESLIE D. MOWER,

JUDGE: HOWARD H. MAETANI

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Defendants', Neways, Inc., Thomas Mower, and
Leslie Mower, Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56(b), filed on or about October 16, 1995, and on Plaintiffs, Macris & Associates, Inc.,
Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56(a), filed on or about November 14, 1995. The Honorable Howard H. Maetani,
Fourth District Court Judge, heard oral arguments on January 29, 1996, and stayed rulings on
the motions before the Court pending a ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals on the appeal of
a judgment in favor of Macris & Associates and Michael Macris in their lawsuit against
Images, Inc., the predecessor corporation to Neways, Inc. The Court of Appeals rejected
every argument raised on appeal and affirmed the judgment against Images, Inc.

Dennis K.

Poole and Andrea Nuffer represent Defendants, Neways, Inc., Thomas Mower, and Leslie
Mower. Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., is represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg, Nathan
B. Wilcox, and Jon V. Harper. This matter has again come before the Court through
Plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Ruling, filed on September 3, 1997, by Plaintiffs new counsel,
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Stephen T. Hard of Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger & Peterson. The Court has reviewed the
file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and heard oral arguments, and upon being advised
in the premises, now makes the following:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris"), is a Utah Corporation and at one
time was a distributor for Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Images"), a Utah Corporation formerly
engaged in multilevel marketing. See Complaint ffl[ 7, 7, 77.
On or about August 1989, Macris entered into a distributorship agreement with Images
and the parties agreed to allow Macris to have automatic qualification of its distributorship,
and attached this provision to the agreement through the Addendum to Distributor
Application. See Complaint \ 12.
Pursuant to the Addendum Agreement, Macris agreed to use its time, marketing
expertise and contacts to build a downline organization within Images' multilevel program.
For this commitment, Images agreed to pay Macris at the highest level of Images' marketing
program for product sales made by the distributors in the Macris downline. See Complaint lfl|
73, 14.
On or about March 7, 1991, Macris received a letter from Images claiming that Macris
was not sufficiently active and suspended the Auto Qualification Agreement, and subsequently
terminated Macris as an Images distributor. See Complaint % 22.
On or about April 17, 1991, Macris filed a lawsuit (Civil Case No. 910400358) against
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Images and Thomas E. Mower for breach of contract, seeking relief in the form of damages
worth the payments it would have received from Images but for the termination of the
distributorship agreement See Complaint ^ 23.
Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), a Utah corporation, engaged in multilevel marketing and
sale of health and beauty products, was incorporated in Utah on or about August 1992, with
Thomas E. Mower as president and Leslie Mower as vice-president See Complaint ffl[ 2, 9.
In early September, 1992, Images transferred substantially all its assets to Neways,
discontinuing its multilevel marketing business, at which time Neways took over the
multilevel marketing operation, using the same facilities, with the same employees, selling the
same products through essentially the same network of distributors. See Defendants'
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ^ 10; Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ^ 3; Maoris v. Images Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law % 17.
On or about September 15, 1995, the Fourth District Court of Utah County, Judge Guy
R. Burningham presiding, entered a Judgment against Images on Macris & Associates' cause
of action for breach of contract An appeal to this decision was filed on or about February 12,
1996.

See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment H 14.
On or about February 15, 1995, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the court of Judge

Boyd L. Park, alleging fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter ego. See Complaint
ffll 30, 38, 45.
Based on these causes of action, Plaintiff asks to be awarded: punitive damages,
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general damages from Thomas E. and Leslie Mower, an Order partially voiding the transfer
from Images to Neways, and an Order making Thomas E. Mower, Leslie Mower, and Neways
liable for commissions to Macris had its distributorship also been transferred to Neways. See
Complaint Prayer for Relief

fll,2,

3, 4.

On or about October 17, 1995, Defendants filed Defendant Neways, Inc. Motion For
Summary Judgment with an accompanying Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary
Judgment filed on or about October 19, 1995, claiming that res judicata bars the plaintiff from
recovering on its claims.
On or about November 13, 1995, Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., filed Plaintiff's
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment.
On or about November 14, 1995, Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum In
Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment.
On or about November 14, 1995, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc.
Motion for Summary Judgment with an accompanying Memorandum In Support of Motion
For Summary Judgment.
On or about November 24, 1995, Defendants filed a Memorandum In Opposition To
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On or about November 28, 1995, the current action was transferred from Judge Park to
Judge Howard H. Maetani, pursuant to the 4th District Court's decision to reassign some
cases.
On or about December 7, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum In Support Of
4
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Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.
Oral arguments were heard on the motions on or about January 29, 1996 in front of
Judge Maetani.
A Stay of the Proceedings was entered on or about February 21, 1996, pending the
completion of all appeals in the previous case.
On September 3, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Ruling, following the
completion of all appeals in the previous case.

n
STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(a) and (b), a party against whom a
claim has been made, may at any time move for a summary judgment in his favor. The
motion should be granted if ". . . the pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law/'
URCP Rule 56(c).

ra
ISSUES
Defendants argue that the current action is barred by res judicata, claiming that the
three elements have been met, in that; the parties are the same, the claim was or could have
been presented in the first suit, and that there was a final judgment on the merits. For the
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sake of this argument, Defendants acknowledge that Neways is in privy with Images, but
contend that this does not make Neways the alter ego of Images, and that there is no
successor liability attached to the acknowledgment.
Plaintiff contends that the elements of res judicata have not all been met, that Neways
and Images are not the same parties, the claims are such that they should not have been
brought into the first action, and that as the previous decision is being appealed, there has not
been a final judgment. However, as Defendants have acknowledged the privity between
Neways and Images, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a judgment on its claim for successor
liability as a matter of law.

IV
ANALYSIS
Claims are barred from being litigated by res judicata when the following three
elements are satisfied:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or
must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third,
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).
A.

PRIVITY BETWEEN NEWAYS AND IMAGES

"The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so identified in
interest with another that he represents the same legal right." Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d
689, 691 (Utah 1978). Neways has acknowledged that there is privity between itself and
6

Images for the purpose of proving res judicata, but denies that this in any way proves
successor liability. Macris refuses to accept Neways' acknowledgment of privity for res
judicata, but then uses it to claim successor liability as a matter of law.
[f it is established that Neways is a "successor in interest of property that is the
subject of pending litigation to which his transferor is bound" then the transferee is "entitled
to the benefits of the rules of res judicata to the same extent as [its] transferor . . .."
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982); Golden State Bottling Co. Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973). Thus, as Neways is the successor in
interest of the property that Images would have used to pay damages to Macris, Neways is
entitled to argue res judicata to the same extent as Images.
Although Utah has not yet addressed the issue of generally establishing successor
liability of corporations, a number of jurisdictions have well established rules in common. See
Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Co., 927 R2d 1128,1131 (10th Cir. 1991) (a
creditor based his claim against a corporation on successor liability, but the court ruled
against him because "a prerequisite for the imposition of liability against a corporation as a
mere continuation of a predecessor is a sale or transfer of all, or substantially all, the assets of
the latter to the former."); Kloberdanz v. Jov Manufacturing Co.. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Co.
1968) (a company that purchased assets from a liable company was found to be not
responsible because there was no hint of fraud, the transfer was made for a good
consideration, and there was no connection between the two companies, such as officers or
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stockholders); Koch v. Speedwell Motor Car Co.. 140 P. 598 (Cal. App. 1914) (the court
states that when a new corporation is merely a continuation of an old corporation, the new
will be held liable for the debts of the old) ; Evanston Insurance Co. v. Luko. 783 P.2d 293
(Haw. App. 1989) (owners of a liable company formed a new company, but the new company
was not liable as there was no transfer of assets; the court stated that successor liability
presupposes a transfer of assets, and its intent is that the "rights of creditors are protected
against a sale , transfer, or distribution of all the corporate property1 in fraud of their rights.
18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2086 at 914 (1985)." A representation of what the common
reasoning is behind successor liability is located in 49 A.L.R. 3d 881, 883:
The general rule seems to be that where a corporation sells or otherwise
transfers all of its assets, its transferee is not necessarily liable for the debts and
liabilities of the transferor. Under some circumstances, the transferee may be
held liable for the debts of the transferor, to wit: (1) where there is an express
or implied assumption of liability; (2) where the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger; (3) where the transaction was fraudulent; (4) where
some of the elements of a purchase in good faith were lacking, as where the
transfer was without consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not
provided for; or (5) where the transferee corporation was a mere continuation
or reincarnation of the old corporation.

In the current action, it would seem that the transfer from Images to Neways would
result in successor liability based on two of the exceptions. First, if as a result of the transfer,
Images is unable to meet its obligation to Macris, it would indicate that some of the elements
of a purchase in good faith were lacking in that the transfer was without consideration
sufficient to provide for the creditors. In Malone v. Red Top Cab Co.. 60 P.2d 543 (Cal.
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App. 1936), the court held that in the case where one corporation takes all the assets of
another corporation without passing any other property or cash to the selling corporation that
could be used to meet any creditor's claim, the purchaser will be obligated to take
responsibility for the seller's debts. Second, as Neways consists of substantially the same
assets, products, officers, and employees as Images, it would seem that Neways is in fact a
mere continuation of the same corporation.

In G. P. Publications. Inc. v. Ouebecor Printing—

St. Paul. Inc. 481 S.E.2d 674 (N.C.App. 1997), the Court considered several factors in
determining the applicability of successor liability, including whether there is identity of
stockholders and directors between two corporations.

w

This...encompasses the situation where

one corporation sells its assets to another with the same people owning both corporations."
Id. at 680, quoting Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.. 195 B.R. 716, 724
(N.D. Ind. 1996) (citing U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co.. 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992).
Therefore, the court finds that Images and Neways are in privity with one another and
that the element of res judicata has been met in barring a claim for further damages.
However, the court finds that Neways does fall into the exceptions to the general rule on
successor liability, and is responsible for meeting the obligation Images currently owes to
Macris.

B. NEWNESS OF CLAIMS BROUGHT IN THE CURRENT ACTION
In both the previous and the current action, claims have arisen from a single breach of
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a single contract, and in the first suit, Macris was awarded damages for that breach. Macris
knew about the creation of Neways before the conclusion of the previous trial, and could have
asked to include Neways in its earning projections if it felt such action was necessary to
obtain sufficient relief from the breach of contract.
Basing a new claim for relief, from a previously adjudicated injury, on different issues,
will not avoid res judicata. "Seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing
a different substantive law premise or ground . . . does not constitute the presentation of a
new claim when the new premise is related to the same transaction or series of transactions
and accordingly the second action should be held barred." Berry v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246, 248
(Utah 1987) (quoting from the Restatement 2d of Judgments § 25 comment d (1982)).
As Macris knew of the transfer from Images to Neways before the conclusion of the
previous action, Macris cannot now present a claim for new damages, based on the fact that
there was a transfer of assets, when the injury is the same as before.
Typically, even when the injury caused by an actionable wrong extends into the
future and will be felt beyond the date of judgment, the damages awarded by
the judgment are nevertheless supposed to embody the money equivalent of the
entire injury. Accordingly, if a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against
a defendant in a certain amount becomes dissatisfied with his recovery and
commences a second action to obtain increased damages, the court will hold
him precluded . . .
Restatement 2d of Judgments § 25 comment c (1982).
In National Finance Co. of Provo v. Daley, 382 P.2d 405 (Utah 1963), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, saying:
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In our judgment it better comports with the orderly processes of justice to
require the plaintiff to bear the responsibility of pleading, proving and claiming
the full benefit of whatever character of cause of action he possesses in the
original action and of being bound thereby, than to allow another trial to come
upon the same cause of action raising issues which could have been dealt with
in the original action.
Because of Macris' knowledge of the transfer of Images' assets to Neways, the issue of
damages in addition to those previously awarded should have been included in the first action.
Plaintiff argues that the claims brought forth in the current action are a result of a new
injury, namely Neways failure to make payments to Macris under the terms of the agreement
between Macris and Images. It would seem that it is plaintiffs contention that the
distributorship agreement between the parties continued to exist beyond the date of the breach
of the contract, and as such, was included in the transfer of assets from Images to Neways.
In fact, it would not be appropriate for plaintiff to receive damages, that are intended
to make him whole, for a breached contract and then seek to have that same agreement
performed.
Whenever there is a total breach of a contract by one party to it, the other is at liberty to
treat the contract as broken and desist from any further effort on his part to perform it. In
other words, he may abandon it and recover, as damages for the breach, the benefits he
would have received by a full performance. . . . Where a contract is thus abandoned, the
primary right to further performance of the promise of the other party is discharged and is
replaced by a remedial right to damages for nonperformance.
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 726. In the suit between Macris and Images, Macris sought
and was awarded damages for breach of contract. Because of this, Macris must be denied in
its current attempt to claim that Neways has failed to perform under the same contract for
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which there was already found to have been a breach.
Macris knew of the transfer from Images to Neways before the conclusion of the first
action, and could have raised question regarding it in that suit. As such, the court finds that
the second element of res judicata has been satisfied in that the issues in the current suit
could and should have been brought forward in the previous action.

C.

FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS

The plaintiff argues that as the first action is being appealed, there has not yet been a
final judgment. In D'Aston v. Aston. 844 P.2d 345,351 (Ut App. 1992), the court stated that
"a judgment is final for purposes of res judicata until it is reversed on appeal, modified, or set
aside in the court of rendition.*' Because the judgment in the previous suit has not been
reversed, this element of res judicata is satisfied.

V
DECISION
As discussed in the above analysis, the court finds that the elements of res judicata
have been satisfied, thus barring Plaintiffs claims for further damages from Neways as a
result of ti e breached contract with Images. However, the court also finds that Neways is the
successor of Images and is liable for the previous judgment against Images.
Therefore, the court GRANTS Defendants', Neways, Inc., Thomas E. Mower, and
Leslie D. Mower, Motion for Summary Judgment as to any claim for new damages.
12
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The court also GRANTS a Partial Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff, Macris &
Associates, Inc., making Neways, as Images' successor, liable for the previous judgment
against Images.
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., is instructed to prepare an Order
consistent with this Decision.

Dated at Provo, Utah this 19th day of September, 1997.

HOWAWlJi^MAETANI
Fourth District Court Judge

cc:\

Dennis K. Poole, Esq.
Andrea Nuffer, Esq.
Roger D. Sandack
Stephen T. Hard
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UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

25-6-2

CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-2.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-6.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim
arising before or after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim
arising before transfer.

Section
25-6-7.
25-6-8.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-11.
25-6-12,
25-6-13,

Transfer — When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief— Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to
chapter.
Construction, of chapter.
Applicability of chapter.

25-6-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act."
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 1; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-1.
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions that
have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was enacted as §§ 25A-1-1 to 25A-1-13; it has been
renumbered and all internal references corrected accordingly under instruction from the
OflEice of Legislative Research and (Jeneral
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors
as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511.
Statute of limitations, § 78-12-26(3).
Uniform Commercial Code — Bulk Transfers, § 70A-6-101 et seq.
Uniform Commercial Code — Sales, § 70A2-101 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

25-6-2. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with
power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the
debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to
vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the
power to vote;
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to
vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns,
controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding
voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the
securities:
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(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the
securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the
power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease
or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are
controlled by the debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or
other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the
extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against
only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.
(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if the debtor is an individual:
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(a)(ii);
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or
person in control; or
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member
or manager;
(b) if the debtor is a corporation:
(i) a director of the debtor;
(ii) an officer of the debtor;
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(b)(iv);
(vi) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a
member or manager; or
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person
in control of the debtor;
(c) if the debtor is a partnership:
(i) a general partner in the debtor;
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a
person in control of the debtor;
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general
partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(c)(iii);
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(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member
or manager; or
(vi) a person in control of the debtor;
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company:
(i) a member or manager of the debtor;
(ii) another limited liability company in which the debtor is a
member or manager;
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(d)(iii);
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, manager, or
person in control of the debtor;
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the
debtor; and
(f) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security
interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or
commercial entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse,
related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the
common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive
relationship within the third degree.
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset
or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease,
and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a
judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or
proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 2; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-2; 1992, ch. 168, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,1992, in Subsection (7),

added Subsections (a)(v), (b)(vi), (c)(v), and (d),
redesignated the existing subsection designations accordingly and made other related
changes and inserted "limited liability company" in Subsection (9).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Creditors.
Intent.
Construction and application.
This section should be construed with liberality so as to reach all artifices and evasions

designed to rob the act of its full force and effect
in preventing debtors from paying the just
claims of their creditors. Butler v. Wilkinson,
740 R2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Creditors.
Persons having claim in tort against grantor
which was not reduced to judgment at time of
alleged fraudulent conveyance held "creditors."
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Imputation of insolvency as defamatoiy, 49 A.L.R.3d 163.

Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
&» 57(1).

25-6-4. Value — Transfer.
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support
to the debtor or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a
reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in
an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or
execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of
the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact
substantially contemporaneous.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-4.

25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or
after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or
incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they
became due.
(2) l b determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may
be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor
had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
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(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor
who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-5.

Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors,
§ 76-6-511.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assignments.
Badges of fraud.
Construction and application.
Constructive trust.
Conveyances between relatives.
Evidence.
Fair consideration.
"Good faith" transfer.
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Parent and child.
Taxation.
Assignments.
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels,
unaccompanied by change of possession, is
fraudulent per se as to execution creditors of, or
subsequent purchasers from, seller or assignor
does not necessarily apply to assignments for
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking
possession is circumstance from which fraud
may be prima facie inferred. Snyder v.
Murdock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899).
Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, delay
or defraud creditors depends upon the facts and
circumstances surrounding the transaction, as
gathered from the badges of fraud present.
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063
(1942).
Badges of fraud.
Although actual fraudulent intent must be
shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its
existence may be inferred from the presence of
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud."
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah
1986).
"Badges of fraud," from which actual intent
may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtor's
(1) continuing in possession and evidencing the
perquisites of property ownership after having
formally conveyed all his interest in the property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipation of

litigation, and (3) making a conveyance to a
family member without receiving fair consideration. Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
(Utah 1986).
Construction and application.
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor
from paying or securing his honest debts, or
from doing equity and exact justice to all of his
creditors by placing his means at their disposal.
Billings v. Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P. 730
(1898).
Former § 25-1-11 applied to real and personal property alike. McGoldrick v. Walker, 838
P.2d 1139 (Utah 1992).
Constructive trust.
A constructive trust was properly imposed to
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land,
which were in excess of the purchase price, had
been paid into court, and a subsequent conveyance to a third-party purchaser for value without notice could not be voided. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Conveyances between relatives.
Conveyances between near relatives, calculated to prevent a creditor from realizing on his
claim against one of such relatives, are subject
to rigid scrutiny. Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540,
15 P.2d 1051 (1932).
The mere fact that the transaction is among
close relatives does not necessarily mean that it
is invalid, but the true facts are subject to proof.
Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 R2d
959 (1960).
A note and mortgage executed by son in good
faith to secure a preexisting obligation which
the son owed his father was not a fraudulent
conveyance. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Conveyances between close relatives are subject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that close
relatives are involved does not render the con-
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STEWART, HOWE, and DURHAM, J J ,
and DOUGLAS L. CORNABY, District
Judge, concur.
OAKS, J., having disqualified himself,
does not participate herein.
CORNABY, District Judge, sat.
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to as the dugway road, was a public thoroughfare which would provide access to his
property. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff,
and the State and city appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1)
neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel
barred action; (2) because city failed to
proffer any evidence at trial level in contradiction to plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, city would*not be permitted to
raise issue whether road was a public thoroughfare for the first time on appeal; and
(3) genuine issue of material fact was raised
as to width of road, thereby precluding
summary judgment on this issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.

Harold G. SCHAER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.

The STATE of Utah, By and Through the
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Salt Lake County, Salt
Lake City Corporation, Utah Power &
Light Company and Lincoln T. Hanson,
Defendants and Appellants.
Harold G. SCHAER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.

The STATE of Utah, By and Through the
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Salt Lake County, Salt
Lake City Corporation, Utah Power &
Light Company and Lincoln T. Hanson,
Defendants and Appellants.
Nos. 18009, 18081.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 10, 1983.

Landowner instituted suit claiming
that certain grade road, commonly referred

1. Judgment <§=*585(3)
Since 1967 litigation ending in determination that no reasonable access existed to
plaintiff's property and present litigation
rested on a different state of facts and
evidence of a different kind of character
was necessary to sustain the two causes of
action and evidence of the two causes of
action related to the status of the property
in two completely different and separate
time periods, doctrine of res judicata did
not apply to preclude plaintiff from maintaining present cause of action in which it
was claimed that a certain graded road was
a public thoroughfare which would provide
access to the plaintiffs property.
2. Judgment <s=*720
Because precise issue of whether dugway road was a public thoroughfare was
not actually raised and litigated in 1967
litigation, doctrine of collateral estoppel did
not apply to preclude plaintiff from maintaining present cause of action in which he
claimed that dugway road was a public
thoroughfare which would provide access to
his property.
3. Appeal and Error ®=* 170(1)
Because city failed to proffer any evidence at trial level in contradiction to plain-
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tiff's motion for summary judgment in action in which he claimed that dugway road
was a public thoroughfare which would provide access to his property, city would not
be permitted to now raise this issue for the
first time on appeal.
4. Judgment o=> 181(15)
In action in which plaintiff claimed
that a certain graded road, commonly referred to as the dugway road, was a public
thoroughfare which would provide access to
his property, genuine issue of material fact
was raised as to width of road, thereby
precluding summary judgment on this issue.

§ 27-12-89 and denied the State of Utah's
(hereinafter "State") Motion for Summary
Judgment based on the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. Subsequently, the plaintiff and Salt Lake City
filed opposing Motions for Summary Judgment claiming, respectively, that the width
of the dugway road is fifty and twenty-five
and one-half feet. The trial court granted
the plaintiff's motion and denied Salt Lake
City's motion. Both the State and Salt
Lake City appealed from those rulings,
which appeals were consolidated for the
convenience of the parties.1 We affirm in
part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

David L. Wilkinson, Stephen J. Sorenson,
Ted L. Cannon, Kevan F. Smith, Roger F.
Cutler, Judy Lever and Rosemary Richardson, Salt Lake City, for defendants and
appellants.

Prior to 1967, the plaintiff owned approximately 22.8 acres of property located near
the mouth of Parley's Canyon in Salt Lake
County. At that time, there were several
routes of ingress and egress to the plainCalvin L. Rampton and Lawrence J. Jen- tiff's land. In July of 1967, trial was held
sen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and re- in the Third District Court in which the
State condemned 4.6 of the approximate
spondent.
22.8 acres of the plaintiff's property for
construction of a highway system. The
DURHAM, Justice:
condemnation deprived the plaintiff of acThis case arose because the plaintiff Ha- cess to his remaining property from the
rold G. Schaer and Salt Lake City Corpora- north and the west, leaving only a possibilition (hereinafter "Salt Lake City") failed to ty of access via the dugway road. Thus, in
reach an agreement regarding the purchase the 1967 litigation, the plaintiff contended
of the plaintiffs property for expansion of that he was entitled to severance damages
a proposed park. The dispute focuses on because his remaining property was effecwhether the doctrines of res judicata and tively landlocked as a result of the condemcollateral estoppel preclude the plaintiff
nation. After trial, the Third District
from maintaining his present cause of acCourt entered the following findings retion. The plaintiff instituted the present
garding the plaintiff's remaining property:
suit claiming that a certain graded road,
(a) There is no reasonable access to said
commonly referred to as the "dugway
remainder property which would permit
road," is a public thoroughfare under
the same to be economically and feasibly
U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-39, which would prodeveloped in the reasonably foreseeable
vide access to the plaintiff's property. The
future.
trial court granted the plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment, holding that the
(b) That a sewage disposal system cannot
dugway road is a public thoroughfare under
be economically and feasibly designed.
1. The defendant Lincoln T. Hanson filed a disclaimer of any right, title or interest in the
property or easement which is the subject of
this litigation. The defendants Salt Lake Coun-

ty and Utah Power & Light Company have
monitored the case but have taken no active
part.
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(c) That it has lost its advantages of annexation to Salt Lake City, potential development as part of the subdivision
proximate to the Salt Lake Country Club
and further, has lost its dedicated and
reserved access way to the north and
west.
(d) That it can no longer be reasonably
and feasibly developed for residential use
presently or in the foreseeable future.
(e) That the highest and best use of the
remainder property is either speculative
or as a public park.
Based on its Findings of Fact, the Third
District Court granted the plaintiff $30,000
as just compensation for the condemnation
of the 4.6 acres and $76,755 as severance
damage to the plaintiff's remaining property.
In 1979, the State was involved in an
inverse condemnation action brought by
Harvey Hanson, an owner of property adjacent to the plaintiff's remaining property.
In that action, the State claimed that the
dugway road was a public thoroughfare.
The State's assertion was based on an alleged public use of the dugway road sufficient to constitute a dedication to the public
under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. However,
that case was settled by the parties prior to
a determination by the court of the State's
assertion that the dugway road was a public
thoroughfare.
The present suit was instituted after the
plaintiff and Salt Lake City failed to reach
an agreement regarding the purchase of the
plaintiff's remaining property for the expansion of a proposed park. The disagreement between the parties focused on
whether the plaintiff's property had access
suitable for residential development by
means of the dugway road. Thus, the
plaintiff filed suit requesting a ruling by
the trial court that the dugway road was a
highway dedicated to the public use pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. The plaintiff then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based on its assertion that the dugway road was a public thoroughfare under

§ 27-12-89. The State filed an opposing
Motion for Summary Judgment which did
not controvert the plaintiff's evidence on
the issue of a public thoroughfare, but rather argued that the plaintiff's position in the
1967 litigation precluded him from maintaining his present cause of action by operation of the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Salt Lake City orally
joined in the State's motion at the time it
was argued. The trial court denied the
State's motion and partially granted the
plaintiff's motion, thereby declaring the
dugway road to be a public thoroughfare,
but reserving for trial the issue regarding
its width. The plaintiff subsequently filed
another Motion for Summary Judgment
claiming that the established width of the
dugway road was fifty feet. Salt Lake
City countered by filing a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that the width of
the dugway road did not exceed twenty-five
and one-half feet. The trial court denied
Salt Lake City's motion and granted the
plaintiff's motion, establishing the width of
the dugway road at fifty feet. Both the
State and Salt Lake City appeal the denial
of their Motions for Summary Judgment
and the resulting granting of the plaintiff's
motions.
On appeal, the State and Salt Lake City
advance several points of error. They contend that the trial court erred in denying
the State's Motion for Summary Judgment
because of the applicability of the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In
addition, Salt Lake City argues that the
trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment that the
dugway road is a public thoroughfare because (1) the finding of a public thoroughfare was based on controverted evidence
which is improper for summary judgment
and (2) the evidence fails to meet the elements of proof necessary under U.C.A.,
1953, § 27-12-89. Salt Lake City also argues that the trial court erred in granting
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the width of the dugway road
because its ruling was not supported by the
evidence.
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The appellants, the State and Salt Lake
City, assert that the district court's previous
finding in the 1967 litigation, that no reasonable access existed to the plaintiff's
property, implies a finding that the dugway
road is not a public thoroughfare. Thus,
the appellants argue that, because of that
implied finding, the plaintiff's present cause
of action is barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. On this
basis, the appellants contend that the trial
court erred in denying the State's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
There are certain distinctions to be made
in the application of the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. In order
to determine which doctrine is to be properly applied, one must focus on whether the
second claim, demand, or cause of action is
different from that of the first:
In order for res judicata to apply, both
suits must involve the same parties or
their privies and also the same cause of
action; and this precludes the relitigation
of all issues that could have been litigated
as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action
Collateral estoppel, on the other hand,
arises from a ifferent cause of action and
prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second
suit that were fully litigated in the first
suit.
Searle Bros. v. Searle, Utah, 588 P.2d 689,
690 (1978) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also East Mill Creek Water Co. v.
2. Both the State and Salt Lake City rely on
Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, Utah, 580
P.2d 243 (1978), as governing the application of
the doctrine of res judicata. However, before
the rules enunciated in the Krofcheck case may
be applied, the appellants must first overcome
the threshold determination of whether the
claims, demands, or causes of action of both
cases are the same.
3. Even though the parties use the terms "judicial estoppel" and "collateral estoppel" as if
they are interchangeable, their arguments appear to be referring to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. In any event, the doctrine of judicial
estoppel is not applicable to the present case.

Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863
(1945); Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292
P. 913 (1930). Accord Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876).
Thus, it is important to recognize that although the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel are closely related, they
are usually mutually exclusive. Where the
claim, demand, or cause of action is the
same in both cases, res judicata applies.
But where the claim, demand, or cause of
action is different in the two cases, then
collateral estoppel is applicable.
[1] Accordingly, we have determined
that res judicata is not applicable to the
present case because it is based on a different claim, demand, or cause of action than
that of the 1967 litigation.2 The two causes
of action rest on a different state of facts
and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two causes of
action. Moreover, the evidence of the two
causes of action relates to the status of the
property in two completely different and
separate time periods. Thus, the doctrine
of res judicata does not apply to preclude
the plaintiff from maintaining his present
cause of action.
We next address the issue of whether
collateral estoppel is applicable.3 After
having determined the threshold issue,
namely, that the present case is based on a
different claim, demand, or cause of action
than that of the 1967 litigation, we apply
four tests which determine the applicability
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel:
1. Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?
In reference to the general rule of "judicial
estoppel" or "estoppel by oath," this Court has
stated that "there is no estoppel where there
was no reliance and the parties had equal
knowledge of the facts." Tracy Loan & Trust
Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 515,
132 P.2d 388, 390-91 (1942) (citations omitted).
The position advanced by the State in the Hansen litigation in 1979, clearly demonstrates that
the State did not in any way "rely" on the
position advanced by the plaintiff in the 1967
litigation. Thus, the absence of any reliance
renders the doctrine of judicial estoppel or estoppel by oath inapplicable to the present case.
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2. Was there a final judgment on the
merits?
3. Was the party against whom the plea
is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?
. . . [4] Was the issue in the first case
competently, fully, and fairly litigated?
Searle Bros. v. Searle, supra, at 691 (citations omitted).
The issues of the present case focus on
whether the first and fourth tests are satisfied. "We [must, therefore,] determine
whether the issues actually litigated in the
first action are precisely the same as those
raised in the present action." Wilde v. MidCentury Insurance Co., Utah, 635 P.2d 417,
419 (1981) (emphasis added). See also In re
Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326
P.2d 105 (1958). The 1967 litigation was a
condemnation action which focused on
whether the plaintiff's remaining property
was effectively landlocked. Despite vague
and indirect references to the dugway road,
the 1967 litigation never focused on the
precise issue of whether the dugway road
was a public thoroughfare under U.C.A.,
1953, § 27-12-89.
The trial court's findings of fact, set
forth earlier, do not purport to rule conclusively on the status of the dugway road
"for all time." They simply express the
trial court's finding that, in 1967, there was
no "reasonable," "economical," or "feasible"
access available for use or development, nor
was there a likelihood of such in "the foreseeable future." One of the uses for the
land noted by the trial court was "speculative," and there is nothing in its findings to
preclude another court twelve years later,
from finding that access is now reasonable,
economical, and feasible by way of the dugway road. In any event, neither the findings nor the judgment entered in the 1967
case demonstrates that the court considered
and ruled on the precise issue in this case,
namely, whether the dugway road met the
requirements of U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89.
[2] This Court has previously stated
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel

"does not apply to issues that merely 'could
have been tried' in the prior case, but operates only to issues which were actually asserted and tried in that case." International Resources v. Dunfield, Utah, 599 P.2d
515, 517 (1979) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Thus, because the precise issue of
whether the dugway road was a public
thoroughfare was not actually raised and
litigated in the 1967 litigation, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel does not apply to preclude the plaintiff from maintaining his
present cause of action. See Wilde v. MidCentury Insurance Co., supra; International Resources v. Dunfield, supra.
[3] Salt Lake City also claims that the
trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the
question of whether the dugway road is a
public thoroughfare because (1) the finding
of a public thoroughfare was based on controverted evidence which is improper for
summary judgment and (2) the evidence
fails to meet the elements of proof necessary under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. Salt
Lake City is correct in its contention that
summary judgment is improper when the
facts are controverted. See Utah R.Civ.P.
56(c). See, e.g., Western Pacific Transport
Co. v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-op,
Utah, 597 P.2d 854 (1979); Frederick May &
Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266
(1962). However, neither the State nor Salt
Lake City presented any evidence whatsoever to contest the facts as presented in the
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Rather, the State and Salt Lake City chose
to rely exclusively on the State's Motion for
Summary Judgment based on the doctrines
of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Under similar circumstances, this Court has
stated that:
[W]here the moving party's evidentiary
material is in itself sufficient and the
opposing party fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when he is presumably in
a position to do so, the courts should be
justified in concluding that no genuine
issue of fact is present, nor would one be
present at trial.
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Upon a motion for summary judgment,
the courts ought to recognize, as a minimum, that the opposing party produce
some evidentiary matter in contradiction
of the movant's case or specify in an
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so.
Where . . . the materials presented by
the moving party are sufficient to entitle
him to a directed verdict [as a matter of
law] and the opposing party fails either
to offer counteraffidavits or other materials that raise a credible issue [of fact] or
to show that he has evidence not then
available, summary judgment may be
rendered for the moving party.
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 269-70,
351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960) (citations omitted).
See also Olwell v. Clark, Utah, 658 P.2d
585 (1982). Thus, because the appellant
Salt Lake City failed to proffer any evidence at the trial level in contradiction
to the plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, Salt Lake City will not be
permitted to now raise the issue for
the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Shayne
v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., Utah, 605 P.
2d 775 (1980). Because the trial court's
ruling was supported by the uncontroverted
facts, we affirm its granting of summary
judgment on that issue.
Salt Lake City's final assertion of error
focuses on Salt Lake City's and the plaintiff's opposing Motions for Summary Judgment regarding the width of the dugway
road. Salt Lake City claims that the trial
court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion because the evidence does not support
the plaintiffs contention that the established width is fifty feet
In granting the plaintiff's motion, the
trial court apparently relied on the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City § 42-7-5
(1975), as establishing the width of the dugway road at fifty feet as a matter of law.
This reliance was misplaced. That ordinance merely sets forth the minimum standards and requirements regarding the
widths of streets in a proposed subdivision
plan. It does not address the reasonable

and necessary width of a highway dedicated
to the public under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-1289. However, even though that ordinance
does not establish the width of the dugway
road as a matter of law, it may be offered
as evidence of what is considered reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.
[4] Both Salt Lake City and the plaintiff cite the proper rule that: "[generally,
the width of a public road is determined
according to what is reasonable and necessary under all the facts and circumstances."
Memmot v. Anderson, Utah, 642 P.2d 750,
754 (1982) (citations omitted). However,
both parties fail to agree as to what is
reasonable and necessary. Salt Lake City
offered evidence that the width did not
exceed twenty-five and one-half feet. The
plaintiff, on the other hand, offered evidence that the width was fifty feet. This
Court has previously stated that: "p] n controversies like this the width of the highway presents a question of fact . . . . "
Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341,351, 44 P.
1032, 1033 (1896). See also Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, Utah,
639 P.2d 211 (1981) (as illustrative of the
factual nature of the width of dedicated
highways). The parties offered conflicting
evidence, which raises a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the width of the
dugway road and precludes summary judgment. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). See, e.g.,
Western Pacific Transport Co. v. Beehive
State Agricultural Co-op, supra; Frederick
May & Co. v. Dunn, supra. Thus, the
granting of summary judgment on this issue was error.
The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs awarded.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.
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is one of fact and not of law. Robinso^ 1Wis. 88,139 N. W. 748,1131; Citizens' Bank &
v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah, 520, 109 P. 81f- T. Co. v. Knox, 187 N. C. 565, 122 S. E. 301;
Tested by these rules, we conclude that the Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Young, 135
La.. 46S, S5 &Q. 011 •, FraLte* ^. Rta& Start..
cient to be submitted to the jury, and th#t Bank, 2 Ohio App. 159.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause
the court erred in directing a verdict for the
plaintiff, for which the judgment must be remanded for a new trial; appellants to recover costs.
reversed.
[8, 9] As a new trial must be had, it is
THURMAN and STRAUP, JJ., concur.
proper here to consider another question preGIDEON, J., did not participate herein.
sented by appellant McCornick. The trnU
FRICK, J., died before announcement of
court sustained objections to McCornick's
offer to prove that he delivered his assign- decision.
ment of the 80,000 shares of United States
Fuel stock to Livingston upon condition th£t
Livingston would deliver it to the plaintiff
BADGER v. BADGER. (No. 4482.)
in payment of Livingston's personal oblige I
tions at the bank including the note sued up(Supreme* Court of Utah. March 21, 1927.>
on, and upon which McCornick was also li&- !
ble. It is not claimed that the plaintiff had j 1. Divorce <§=3245(3)—Wife, If dissatisfied
with decree of property settlement, had remknowledge or notice of this condition, in
edy by motion for new trial or by appeal, not
excluding the evidence we perceive no error*
by new petition.
The only issue was payment. And whether
After decree for divorce, remedy of wifer
or not the note in question was paid depends \
upon the contract between Livingston and j if dissatisfied with court's determination of her
petition to modify decree affecting property, was
the plaintiff, in the making of which McCof- j either DY motion for new trial or appeal from
nick did not participate at all. Assuming j decision; and hence she could not disregard
the excluded evidence to be true, it could not | judgment and proceed by new petition to again
affect or control the agreement made by try issues theretofore heard and determined.
Livingston and the plaintiff as to what notes
2. Action <©=»53(D— Party having one entire
were to be discharged. Neither was the evidemand cannot split it Into separate causes of
dence admissible upon the theory that Livaction.
ingston was the agent of the plaintiff in obA party having one entire demand cannot
taining the assignment from McCornick. A split it up into separate causes of action.
debtor is not the creditor's agent in procuring security for the debt. Campbell v. Mur- 3. Judgment <§=3592—If party by accident, neglect, mistake, or fraud, splits single cause of
ray, 62 Ga. 86; Helmes v. Wayne Agriculaction, adjudication thereon does not bar suit
tural Co., 73 Ind. 325, 38 Am. Rep. 147;
on the other.
Wheeler v. Barr, 7 Ind. App. 381, 34 N. 15.
While generally party cannot split single de591; Carter v. Goff, 141 Mass. 123,5 N. E. 471; mand into separate causes of action, if by acHyatt v. Zion, 102 Va. 909, 48 S. E. 1; Wood- cident, excusable neglect, mistake, or fraud
ward v. Bixby, 68 N. H. 219, 44 A. 298.
of his adversary, and without pleader's fault, he
[10, 11] The appellant McCornick urges the splits single cause of action, adjudication in
further question that, on account of the re- respect to one will not bar suit on the other.
lease by the bank of the shares of stock in 4. Divorce <©=>245(3)— Rule against splitting/
the irrigation company which had been pledgof cause of action applies to petition, wheresingle ground of complaint is relied on for
ed to secure the payment of Livingston's notes
modification or change in judgment.
to the plaintiff, he, as an indorser, who was
Rule against splitting a cause of action ia
only secondarily liable, was thereby discharged from liability. Assuming, but not decidingf complaint held to apply to petition for modificathat such claim is available to appellant un- tion of a divorce decree wherein single ground
is relied on for modification or change in judgder the Negotiable Instruments Law, the ment entered.*
plea must fail, because there was no showing
whatever of the value of the securities sur- 5. Pleading <§=>360(4)—Motion to strike a
pleading will be granted only in clear case.
rendered. It appears that in consideration of
Courts do not look with favor upon the
the release of the irrigation stock Livingston
supplied additional securities consisting of striking of pleadings, and motion to strike will*
his interest in the 80,000 shares of United be granted only in clear case.
States Fuel stock. There was no attempt to 6. Pleading <§=>352—Generally, pleading should1
not be stricken If susceptible of amendment.
prove, and it cannot be inferred from the
Generally, a pleading should not be stricken
evidence, that McCornick suffered any injury
from the transaction. This plea, when other- if it is susceptible of being amended so as to
wise made out, only goes to a discharge pro *Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah, 456, 154 P . 952; Chaffe*
tanto to the extent of the impairment of the v. Chaffee, 63 Utah, 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood v.
securities. State Bank, etc., v. Michel, 152 Rockwood, 65 Utah, 261, 236 P. 457.
@=3For other cases see same topic and KEY-DUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
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constitute either a cause of action or a de- he alleges were justified under the circumfense.
stances.
After the issues were thus joined, the
7. Divorce <§==>245 (3) —Wife's petition to modify decree held properly stricken, where she plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreehad had hearing on matters complained of ment adjusting their property rights in the
therein.
event the court in which the case was pendWife's petition for modification of divorce ing should grant a decree of divorce. Theredecree awarding property to her held properly upon the defendant filed an amended crossstricken, where she had had hearing on mat- complaint in which she omits some of the
ters complained of therein and pleaded no facts alleged acts of cruelty contained iu her origwhich constituted legal excuse for her failure inal cross complaint, and further alleges that
to set them out in first petition for modificaa property settlement has been had between
tion.
plaintiff .and defendant, and she prays judgAppeal from District Court, Salt Lake ment that the property settlement theretofore
agreed upon be ratified and affirmed by the
County; Ephraim Hansen, Judge.
court and that she be granted a decree of diAction by Ralph A. Badger against Norma vorce. The plaintiff filed no answer or other
D. Badger. Decree of divorce for defendant pleadings to the cross-complaint of the deon her cross-complaint From order striking fendant.
defendant's amended petition to modify deThe defendant offered evidence in support
cree, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
of her cross-complaint, and the court, at the
Willard Hanson and A. H. Hougaard, both conclusion of her evidence, made findings of
of Salt Lake City, for appellant
fact, conclusions of law, and entered a decree
Badger, Rich & Rich, of Salt Lake City, of # divorce in favor of the defendant and
for respondent.
against the plaintiff. In the decree she was
awarded the property provided for in the
HANSEN, J. The plaintiff brought this ac- agreement theretofore entered into between
tion against the defendant in the district the plaintiff and defendant. The property so
court of Salt Lake county for the purpose of awarded to the defendant consisted of a consecuring a decree of divorce from the defend- tract for the purchase of the Roselyn Apartant. The plaintiff and the defendant have ments on which there was a balance owing of
been married a little less than two years and §6,630.97 as of February 1,1926, also a vacant
there are no children issue of the marriage. lot 37x822 feet adjoining the Roselyn ApartVarious acts of cruelty are alleged by the ments ; also, $150 cash; rent due from a Mrs.
plaintiff as a basis for the relief prayed. Smith in the sum of $25; a court allowance
The defendant filed an answer denying any for the month of February, 1926, amounting
acts of cruelty on her part. She also filed a to the sum of $112; and an additional sum
cross-complaint wherein tshe alleges that the of $300 as attorneys' fee for defendant's atplaintiff has been guilty of various acts of torneys.
cruelty towards the defendant She further
The decree of divorce was signed and filed
alleges that the plaintiff owns real and per- on February 23, 1926, and four days theresonal property of the value of $100,000 or after, February 27, 1926, a notice of applicamore, that the property owned by plaintiff tion to set aside the decree of divorce was
consists of the Oxford Apartments, situated served upon the attorneys for the plaintiff,
at 119 West North Temple street, the Roselyn to which was attached a copy of a verified
Apartments, situated at 853 South Fourth petition stating the basis for said motion.
East street, a double house situated at Nos. This petition was filed on March 2, 1926. In
1072 and 1074 East Seventeenth South street, the petition the defendant sets out that she
all in Salt Lake City, Utah, and also certain had consented to take* the Roselyn Apartlarge acreage of land situated near Holden, ments as the principal settlement of the propin Millard county, Utah; that the personal erty rights which she was to receive relying
property belonging to the plaintiff includes upon the representation of the plaintiff that
a large stock interest in various corporations, the income from said property amounted to
among them being Ralph A. Badger & Co. $140 per month, but that this property would
and the M t Nebo Marble Company. She al- not rent for to exceed $120 per month; that
so alleged in her, cross-complaint that the there was a balance due on the contract of
plaintiff received a salary of $300 per month purchase of said apartments in the sum of
and has a net income in excess of $300 per $6,630.97, payable $100 per month; and that
month. In her cross-complaint she prays if she is compelled to pay the taxes, repairs,
judgment against the plaintiff for a decree 6f and insurance, with a rental of only $120 per
separate maintenance and an equitable pro- month, she will be unable to pay for the apartportion of the property belonging to the plain- ment house, and the contract of purchase will
tiff.
be forfeited.
To this cross-complaint plaintiff filed a reTo this petition an answer was filed deply, wherein he denies all acts of cruelty al- nying the alleged representations, and upon
leged by the defendant, except such acts as these issues a hearing was had, and the court
3fc=>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER In all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
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modified the decree of divorce, to the effect i able to get a property settlement except the
that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant one that was later executed by the parties
an additional $120, but otherwise the decree herein. I t is also alleged that she informed
of divorce would remain in full force and ef- her counsel that she would not consent to the
fect. The hearing was had on March 4, 1926, proposed property settlement unless she reand the modification of the decree was signed ceived, in addition to the property mentioned,
by the trial judge on March 10, 1926, and at least a few thousand dollars, and suggested $5,000 in cash. It is also alleged that she
filed with the clerk on the day following.
On March 16, 1926, the defendant filed an- signed the property settlement and the
other petition for a modification of the de- amended cross-complaint for a decree of dicree of divorce, in which other counsel ap-1 vorce, but that she did so in the courtroom
peared as her attorneys, and under date of I while in an excited and abnormal state of
May 22, 1926, by leave of court, an amended mind, and did not then and there fully unpetition was filed by the defendant. This pe- derstand or appreciate her rights in connectition refers to and makes the original eross- tion with said divorce proceedings and did
comp^int of the defendant a part of the pe- not understand that she was not to receive an
tition and sets forth that the acts of cruelty additional $5,000. It is also alleged that the
alleged in such original cross-complaint are court was not fully advised of the cruel and
true. It is also alleged that at the time of inhuman treatment that she had received
filing the cross-complaint the plaintiff was from the plaintiff, and if the court was fully
the owner of the property therein mentioned advised in regard to such treatment the court
and set out; that the Oxford Apartments ; should and would grant her a more favorable
were worth from $30,000 to $50,000; that the property settlement. Nowhere in the amendpropertv situated at Seventeenth South and ed petition is there any allegation to the efEleventh East streets was of the value of $10,- fect that she was not fully advised of the
000; the equity of the plaintiff in the Roselyn matters complained of by her in such amendApartments was of the value of $1,500; the ed petition at the time she fi'ed her first peMillard county property was worth $3,000; tition for an amendment of the decree of dithat the plaintiff was the owner of a large vorce. The defendant in her amended petiamount of stock in the Ralph A. Badger & tion prays judgment that the decree of di"Co., and the same was of great value; that vorce be vacated and set aside; that the alhe received a salary of at least $300 per leged contract of property settlement be canmonth; and that he was in receipt of at least celed and declared void; that the cause be
the sum of $800 per month and was able to set down for trial on her original answer and
provide for the defendant according to her cross-complaint; that she be allowed a fair
station in life. I t is also alleged that there and reasonable amount of plaintiff's propwas owing upon the contract for the purchase erty, $200 per month as permanent alimony,
of the Roselyn Apartments $6,600; that the and a reasonable sum for counsel fees and
rents derived therefrom did not exceed $120 suit money, and for general relief.
per month; that $100 per month must be paid
To the amended petition the plaintiff filed
on the contract of purchase; that petitioner a general and special demurrer and also a
is unable to pay the sum of $100 per month in motion to strike the amended petition upon
addition to the expenses of repairs, insur- the grounds, among others, that said petition
ance, taxes, and other items of expense; and is sham, irrelevant, and redundant, and that
that unless she is granted additional relief she the amended petition is in all material rewill lose the apartment house by forfeiture of spects the same as the petition filed on Febthe contract of purchase. The defendant ruary 27, 1926, and upon the further ground
further alleged that at the time the property that the court was without jurisdiction to ensettlement was had the plaintiff gave to her tertain the petition.
then attorneys a statement of his financial
After arguments of respective cobnsel on
condition and his property, from which it the demurrer and motion to strike, the court
was made to appear that the plaintiff was I entered its order striking the amended petinot abte to pay the defendant any alimony; tion on the ground that the cause of action
that said statement was false, in that the set forth in said amended petition has in all
plaintiff was the owner of the property above essential particulars been heretofore presentmentioned; that the plaintiff further repre- ed and petitioner has had her day in court
sented that the rentals of the Roselyn Apart- and should have presented at one time all of
ments amounted to the sum of $140 per the grounds claimed by her at the time she
month and that they were in a good state of filed her petition on February 27, 1926, and
repair, and that the indebtedness owing on also that there are no new matters alleged in
the contract of purchase was the sum of $6,- said petition as having occurred since the en000, Vhich said representations were false; tering of the original decree herein. I t is
that these false representations were so made I from this order striking the amended petiwith the intention that they should be acted tion that the appeal to this court is prosecutupon by the defendant. It is also alleged that ed, and the appellant assigns as error the
her then counsel, relying upon these false granting of the motion to strike the amended
statements, informed her that they were un- I petition for a modification of the decree of

Utah)

BADGER v BADGER

787

(254 P.)

divorce and the denial of appellant's right to
be heard upon the merits of her amended petition thus stricken.
[1] As to the Koselyn Apartments, the record shows that the same matters which are
set out in the amended petition which was
dismissed were also set out in the flrst petition filed for the purpose of securing an
amendment of the decree of divorce, upon
which first petition a hearing was had and a
modification of the decree of divorce was
granted, except that the first petition did not
recite that the plaintiff misrepresented the
amount of indebtedness upon the contract of
purchase of the Roselyn Apartments. The
contract of property settlement signed by the
parties hereto, however, does set forth that
there was $6,630.97 still Owing on the contract of purchase of the Roselyn Apartments
as of February 1, 1926, and therefore the defendant must have known that this, indebtedness existed against the property at the time
the hearing was had and the divorce granted
and also at the time she filed her first petition for an amendment of the decree of divorce. Defendant having had one hearing upon her grievances with respect to the Roselyn
Apartments, she, of course, is not entitled to
another hearing upon the same matter. If
she were dissatisfied with the court's determination of these matters, her remedy was
either by a motion for a new trial or by an
appeal from the decision rendered. She, of
course, could not totally disregard the judgment then rendered and proceed to again try
by a separate pleading the issues theretofore
heard and determined.
[2] I t is a well-settled rule of law, under
both common-law and the Code system of
pleading, t h a t a party having one entire demand cannot split the demand up into separate causes of action. 1 Sutherland, Code
Prac. & Forms, § 218; Cooley v. Calaveras
County. 121 Cal. 4S2, 53 P. 1075; U. S. v.
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 65, 25 L. Ed. 9 3 ; 1 C.
J. 1006; 1 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications,
204. I n fact, as stated^ in the case of U. S.
v. Throckmorton, supra:
"There are no maxims of the law more firmly
established or of more value in the administration of justice than the two which are designed
to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy, namely: Interest reipublicae, ut sit
finis litium, and nemo [debet] bis vexari pro
una et eadem causa."

and his failure to do so is due to his own fault
or neglect, it would seem that upon both principle and authority the general rule against
splitting applies. Macon, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Gerrard, 54 Ga. 827.
[4] In this case it is clear that the matters
complained of by the defendant in her last
amended petition constitute a single cause of
action, namely, the alleged misrepresentation of the plaintiff as to his inability to
make a more favorable property settlement
with the defendant than the one actually entered into. It affirmatively is made to appear
that at the time tne first petition was filed for
a modification o** the decree of divorce the defendant knew the contents of said decree and
that she was to receive no property except
that actually awarded to her. In the amended petition which was stricken there is no allegation that she did not have the same
knowledge about plaintiff's property and income at the time she filed her first petition
that she had at the time she filed the stricken amended petition. Indeed, at the time she
filed her first cross-complaint she alleges that
the plaintiff was the owner of the same property and in receipt of the same salary and income as is again set out in the amended petition. Of course, it may be that the plaintiff by false and improper representations
convinced the defendant that these claims
made by her in her original cross-complaint
were not true and that she is therefore entitled to have this matter again heard. In
this case, however, in so f a» as is made to appear in the amended petition which was
stricken, the appellant had as much knowledge about the plaintiff's property and income
at the time she filed her first petition as she
had at the time she filed the amended petition which was stricken. The reasons that
form the basis for the rule against splitting
the cause of action in a complaint must of
necessity apply with equal force to a petition
wherein a single ground of complaint is relied upon for the modification or a change in
a judgment theretofore made and entered.
There is complaint made in the petition
stricken that the appellant omitted from her
second cross-cornplaint some of the acts of
cruelty committed upon and towards her by
the plaintiff, but she doubtless knew these at
the time she filed her second cross-complaint
and also at the time she filed her first petition
for an amendment of her decree of divorce,
and in any event it is very doubtful whether
[3] To this well-established general rule, these matters have any bearing upon the
however, there are exceptions. If a person amount of property to which she is entitled,
by accident, excusable neglect, or mistake, or in the absence of any claim that the omitted
by fraud on the part of his adversary and alleged acts of cruelty affected her health or
without any fault of the pleader, splits a earning capacity.
Counsel for appellant seems to contend that
single cause of action, an adjudication in respect to one will not bar a suit upon the oth- thQ well-recognized rule against splitting a
er. 1 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications, 206; cause of action does not apply to a divorce
1 C. J. 1009, and cases there cited. If, how- proceeding. We are unable to see any good
ever, the pleader is in possession of the means reason why a husband and wife should be
of ascertaining the full extent of his claim, given any more latitude in continuing their
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controversies in court than other litigants,
except in those cases permitted by our statute and under facts showing changed conditions, as held by this court in the cases of
Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah, 456, 154 P. 952;
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah, 261, 225 P. 76;
Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah, 261, 236 P.
457. In this case there is no claim made that
there are any changed conditions coming
within the rules laid down in the above
cases.
From what has been said it follows that the
amended petition which was ordered stricken
does not allege sufficient facts to warrant the
trial court in granting the defendant any further or additional relief. I t is conceivable,
however, that the defendant might have alleged and shown sufficient facts to have entitled her to a hearing and relief in the trial
court upon those matters that were not heard
and determined upon the first petition for an
amendment to the decree of divorce. This
brings us to the question of whether or not
the trial court committed prejudicial error
in striking the amended petition.
[5-7] I t is a well-settled rule of law in
most, if not all, jurisdictions that courts do
not look with favor upon the striking of
pleadings, and a motion to strike a pleading
will be granted only in a clear case. 31 Cyc.
616, and cases there cited. Generally, a
pleading should not be stricken if it is susceptible of being amended so as to constitute
either a cause of action or a defense. In this
case we are not prepared to hold, and we do
not hold, that the facts are such that the defendant as a matter of law could not properly have amended her amended petition in
such a way as to entitle her to a further
hearing upon the matters not disposed of in
her first petition for a modification of the decree of divorce; but we do hold that the facts
alleged in the amended petition ordered
stricken did not entitle her to a further hearing, and for the reason that it affirmatively
appears that the appellant has had a hearing
upon some of the matters complained about in
her amended petition, and upon other matters
complained of, no facts are pleaded which
constitute a legal excuse for her failure to
set them out in her first petition for a modification of the decree of divorce. Had the appellant herein desired to further amend her
petition in the trial court, she doubtless
would have been granted leave to amend, or
if such leave had been refused, such refusal
may well have been prejudicial error. I t is
not made to appear, however, either in the
trial court, or this court, that the appellant
desires to amend the petition stricken or that
the same could, under the facts, be amended
to entitle the defendant to any further relief for the reasons above set forth. Upon the
record in this case the appellant stands in
the same position that she would have been in

(Idaho

had the general demurrer been sustained, and
upon appellant refusing to further plead the
petition dismissed. Such proceeding would
have been more in accord with the practice
of this and most other jurisdictions, unless
indeed counsel for appellant stated to the
trial court a t the time of the argument that
they did not intend to amend the petition
which was stricken.
In any event, it is not made to appear that
appellant was prejudiced by the striking of
the amended petition, and therefore it follows that the order striking the amended petition of the defendant should be and the
same is affirmed. Respondent to recover his
costs.
THURMAN, O. J., CHERRY and STRAUP,
JJ., and McCREA, District Judge, concur.
FRICK, J., absent on account of illness
when submitted, and died before announcement of decision.
STATE v. ARREGUI.
(Supreme Court of Idaho.

(No. 4704.)
March 26, 1927.)

I. Criminal law <§=>394—Vaiidity of warrant
and search may be raised by motion to suppress evidence at trial (Const. U. S. Amend.
4; Const. Idaho, art. I, § 17; C. S. Idaho, §
2637, and § 9456, subd. 6).
Validity of warrant and search, under
Const. U. S. Amend. 4, and Const. Idaho, art.
1. § 17, may properly be tested by motion to
suppress evidence at the trial, since, in view of
C. S. § 2637, and section 9456, subd. 6, no
independent action could be maintained to secure fruits of illegal search and seizure, and
refusal to permit motion to suppress evidence
would operate to deny raising question of violation of constitutional rights,
2. Constitutional law <@=^35—Rules of expediency must not be placed above Constitution.
Law and court made rules of expediency
must not be placed above the Constitution.
3. Intoxicating liquors <§=>244—State law relative to search and seizure held applicable to
search under federal warrant, where evidence was turned over to state officer (C. S.
§ 2637).
C. S. § 2637, providing for search and seizure under state prohibition laws, held applicable to search made under authority of purported federal search warrant, where evidence
seized thereunder was turned over to state officers.
4. Intoxicating liquors <§=^248—Affidavit for
search warrant, stating affiant had information that liquor was sold and knowledge of
defendant's reputation as liquor dealer, insufficient (Const. U. S. Amends. 4, 5; Const.
Idaho, art. I, §§ 13, 17).
Affidavit by federal prohibition agent for
search warrant to effect that he had been informed that liquor was sold on certain premises, and that he knew defendant had reputation of dealing in liquor, held insufficient, under
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trial court to award Industrial its reasonable
attorney fees incurred on appeal.
BENCH and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
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1. Appeal and Error <3=>842(1)
Becauge summary judgment

presents

only questions of law, Court of Appeals accords no deference to trial court's ruling and
reviews it for correctness.
2. Judgment 0 6 3 4
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
prevents relitigation of issues that have once
been litigated even though claims for relief
may be different.

The ESTATE OF Douglas B. COVING*
TON, By and Through its Co-Personal
Representatives, Robert H. COVINGTON and Mary C. Whetman, Plaintiffs
and Appellees,

3. Judgment e=>634

v.

4. Judgment <3>720

John C. and Geraldine C. JOSEPHSON,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 930371-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 22, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1995.

Whereas res judicata prevents relitigation of identical causes of action or demands, collateral estoppel disallows relitigation of issues.

Vendors were not collaterally estopped
from suing purchasers to recover taxes and
water assessments vendors paid on property,
even though purchasers had, in vendors' earlier suit against purchasers, asked for and
received finding that contract for purchase of
property in question had been paid in full;
there was no evidence that taxes and assessments were actually litigated in prior action.
5. Judgment ®=»713(2), 739

Vendors sued purchasers, seeking repayment of property taxes and water assessments that vendors made on property in
question. Purchasers moved for summary
judgment, arguing that action was precluded
by vendors' prior action against purchasers,
which resulted in judgment awarding purchasers title to property. Vendors also
moved for summary judgment. The Third
Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Robin
W. Reese, J., granted vendors' motion for
summary judgment. Purchasers appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held
that: (1) neither res judicata nor collateral
estoppel was applicable, and (2) vendors' attorney's undisputed affidavit supported
award of attorney fees.
Affirmed.
Davis, J., issued opinion concurring in
result.

Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel precluded vendors' action against purchasers to recover taxes and water assessments that vendors paid on property conveyed, even though purchasers, in vendors'
prior action against purchasers, asked for
and received finding that contract for purchase of that property had been paid in full;
vendors had no reason to bring claim for
taxes or assessments in prior action, as purchasers represented during trial that they
would pay any taxes and assessment regarding property, and any claim for reimbursement of taxes and assessments would not
have been ripe for adjudication during prior
action, as vendors did not pay taxes and
assessments until well after completion of
that action.
6. Appeal and Error <5^241
Raising issue in posttrial motion does
not preserve that issue for appeal.
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7. Costs <s=>208
Trial courts are not required to make
specific findings regarding attorney fees
where all relevant facts are undisputed; undisputed relevant facts supporting such
award include unrebutted affidavit.
8. Costs e=>207
Plaintiffs' attorney's undisputed affidavit
was sufficient to support award of attorney
fees to plaintiffs.
Gordon A. Madsen, North Salt Lake, for
appellants.
David K. Broadbent, Salt Lake City, for
appellees.
Before DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and
JACKSON, JJ.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendants, John C. Josephson and Geraldine C. Josephson (the Josephsons), appeal
the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of plaintiff, the Estate of Douglas B.
Covington, by and through its co-personal
representatives, Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman (the Estate). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from a second lawsuit
involving a real property transaction. Douglas and Alice Covington sold a tract of real
property located in Salt Lake County (the
Property) and five shares of water stock to
the Josephsons pursuant to a Uniform Real
Estate Contract dated May 4, 1973 (the Contract).
Douglas Covington and John Josephson
subsequently entered into a written addendum to the Contract granting the Josephsons
a right-of-way to the Property across adjacent land owned by the Covingtons. Alice
1. The Contract states that
In the event the Buyer shall default in the
payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance premiums as herein
provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay
said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either of them, and if Seller elects so to
do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller
upon demand.

Covington died in 1981 and Douglas Covington died in 1987, leaving Robert Covington
and Mary Whetman as co-personal representatives of the Estate.
Sometime in 1989, a dispute arose between
the Josephsons and the Estate regarding the
right-of-way. As a result, the Josephson's
recorded a Notice of Interest asserting their
rights in the right-of-way. In May 1989, the
Estate filed the first suit against the Josephsons in Third District Court of Salt Lake
County seeking to quiet title to the right-ofway, for damages for slander of title and
trespass, and for an injunction restraining
the Josephsons from continued use of the
right-of-way.
The Josephsons counterclaimed requesting that the court quiet title
in them to the right-of-way, award them the
five shares of water stock, and declare that
the Contract was "fully paid and performed
by Josephsons, and Josephsons are entitled
to conveyance" of the Property.
A bench trial was held before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, who ruled in favor of
the Josephsons and, in a judgment dated
December 18, 1991 (Judgment), awarded the
Josephsons title to the Property, including
the claimed right-of-way, and awrarded attorney fees.
Subsequently, on May 8, 1992, the Estate
paid the property taxes and water assessments for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991 on
the Property and the five shares of water
stock consistent with the terms of the Contract.1 After demand by the Estate, the
Josephsons refused to repay the Estate for
the taxes and assessments paid.2
On July 7, 1992, the Estate filed a second
lawsuit in the Third Circuit Court for Salt
Lake County, seeking to recover the amounts
it paid for taxes and water assessments and
attorney fees. Both sides filed motions for
summary judgment, and, on February 16,
2. The Estate paid the taxes and assessments on
the Property because it wished to sell real estate
it owned adjacent to the Property. Since the
Estate's and the Josephson's property were jointly assessed by Salt Lake County, taxes and assessments on both parcels had to be paid so that
the Estate could deliver clear title to the purchaser of its property
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1993, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate. The trial court
denied the Josephsons' subsequent Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment. This appeal followed.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
We address the following issues on appeal:
(1) Is the Estate's action barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel?
(2) Was the Contract terminated by the District Court action so as to preclude a claim
under it? (3) Were the attorney fees awarded to the Estate excessive?3

"In order for res judicata to apply, both
suits must involve the same parties or
their privies and also the same cause of
action; and this precludes the relitigation
of all issues that could have been litigated
as well as those that were in fact litigated
in the prior action."
Id. at 1340 (quoting Searle Bros. v. Searle,
588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)). In addition,
" 'the first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.' " In re J.J.T., 877
P.2d 161, 163 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah
1988)).

[2,3] Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues that
have once been litigated even though the
STANDARD OF REVIEW
claims for relief may be different. Pen rod v.
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875
when there are no genuine issues of material (Utah 1983). Thus, whereas res judicata
fact and the moving party is entitled to judg- prevents a relitigation of identical causes of
ment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. action or demands, collateral estoppel disal56(c). In reviewing a motion for summary lows a relitigation of issues. Schaer, 657
judgment, this court considers "all of the P.2d at 1340. The elements of collateral
facts and evidence presented, and every rea- estoppel include:
sonable inference arising therefrom, in a
"(1) Was the issue decided in the prior
light most favorable to the party opposing
adjudication identical with the one presentthe motion." Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d
ed in the action in question?
405, 408 (Utah App.1987). Further, because
(2) Was there a final judgment on the
summary judgment presents only questions
merits?
of law, this court accords no deference to the
(3) Was the party against whom the plea
trial court's ruling and reviews it for correctis asserted a party or in privity with a
ness. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation
party to the prior adjudication?
Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Mum. . . [4] Was the issue in the first case
ford v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 P.2d
completely, fully and fairly litigated?"
1041, 1043 (Utah App.1993).
Id. at 1340-41 (quoting Searle Bros, 588 P.2d
at 691).
ANALYSIS
The Josephsons argue that in the first suit,
they asked for and received a finding from
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
the District Court that the Contract had
The Josephsons assert that the Estate's
been "paid in full." The Josephsons assert
action is barred by the doctrine of res judicathat because of this finding, any claim for
ta and/or collateral estoppel.
payments due under the Contract, including
In Schaer v. State ex rel. UDOT, 657 P.2d a claim for taxes and water assessments, has
1337 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court already been litigated and thus is barred by
set forth the elements of res judicata. In res judicata. Further, the Josephsons assert
that even if res judicata does not apply,
Schaer, the court stated:
3. The Josephsons also raise additional issues including collateral attack and the existence of
material facts precluding summary judgment.
We find these claims lacking in merit and therefore do not address them. See State v. Carter,

776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating that
appellate courts "need not analyze and address
in writing each and every argument, issue, or
claim raised").
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collateral estoppel applies because the "paid
in full" finding at least shows that identical
issues were litigated.4
[4] However, res judicata and collateral
estoppel only apply where the issue "was
actually litigated" in the first action, Aragon
v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250, 254 n.
6 (Utah App.1993), or the claim "could and
should have been raised in the first action."
Madsen v. BoHhick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah
1988). The Josephsons have failed to produce any evidence to show that taxes and
assessments were actually litigated in the
District Court. Therefore, we find that the
issue was not "actually" litigated in the prior
action, thus precluding application of collateral estoppel.
[5] We must next determine if the claims
"could and should have been raised" in the
prior action. Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247. In
their affidavits, David K. Broadbent, the Estate's counsel, and Mary C. Whetman, one of
the Estate's co-personal representatives,
state that prior to trial of the first suit, the
Josephsons, through their attorney, represented to the Estate that they would pay any
taxes and assessments regarding the Property. This representation was apparently
made again during trial. In his affidavit,
John C. Josephson denies that a "stipulation"
regarding taxes and assessments was ever
entered into at trial, but does not deny that
such representations were made either prior
to or during trial. Relying upon those undisputed representations, the Estate had no
reason to bring a claim for the taxes or
assessments in the prior action.
Moreover, the Estate didn't pay the taxes
and assessments until May 8, 1992, well after
the completion of the prior action. Any
claim for reimbursement of the Estate's payment of those taxes and assessments was not
"ripe for adjudication" at the time of the
4.

It appears that the Estate concedes, and we
agree, that the first action involved the same
parties and that there was a final adjudication on
the merits. Thus, the issue narrows to whether
identical claims or issues were previously litigated.

5. We note that in State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held that
issues raised and dealt with in post-trial evidentiary hearings are preserved for appeal. Id. at

District Court action and therefore could not
have been brought. See Andreivs v. Utah
Bd. of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah
1992).
Taxes and water assessments were never
addressed in the prior action. Further, because such claims were not then disputed,
they were not ripe and should not be classified as ones that "could and should have been
litigated." Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247. Thus,
the purposes of res judicata and collateral
estoppel to limit "parties to one fair trial of
an issue or cause," and further to serve such
"public interests as 'fostering reliance on prior adjudication, preventing inconsistent decisions, relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,' and 'conserving
judicial resources/" J.J.T., 877 P.2d at 162
(quoting Office of Recovery Sews. v. V.G.P.,
845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App.1992)) are not
present here. Therefore, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel precludes the Estate's action.
Termination of Contract
The Josephsons assert that because the
District Court ruled that the Contract was
paid in full, it was thereafter terminated and
no longer available to support a claim for
taxes, water assessments, or attorney fees.
[6] The Josephsons did not raise this issue until their Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment submitted to the trial court after it
granted summary judgment in favor of the
Estate. Raising an issue in a post-trial motion—or as is the case here, post-summary
judgment—does not preserve that issue for
appeal. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Beehive Medical Elecs. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 861
(Utah 1983); LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel
Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 484 (Utah App.1991).5
265-66. See also State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d
1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (holding that because
trial judge took evidence on and ruled upon a
challenge to hearsay evidence at trial—even
though the objection was not timely raised—the
issue was preserved for appeal). However, we
believe Belgard and Matsamas are inapplicable to
this case. Unlike the situation here, the trial
court in both cases had the opportunity and
chose to take evidence and fully hear the argu-
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Thus, we find that this issue was not properly preserved and therefore decline to address
it.6
Attorney Fees
The Josephsons next claim that issues of
fact exist precluding summary judgment because the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the
attorney fees awarded.
[7] In Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 28
Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that unless the parties
agree otherwise, a trial court must take evidence of the reasonableness of attorney fees
and make findings thereon. Id. at 630. See
also Utah Code Jud.Admin. R4-505 (setting
forth criteria for affidavits in support of attorney fees). However, trial courts are not
required to make specific findings regarding
attorney fees where all the relevant facts are
undisputed, Taylor n Estate of Taylor, 770
P.2d 163, 168-69 n. 6 (Utah App.1989). Undisputed relevant facts supporting an award
of attorney fees includes an unrebutted affidavit. Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker, 537 P.2d
1039, 1040 (Utah 1975).
[8] In this case, the attorney fees awarded are supported by the affidavit of David K.
Broadbent, attorney for the Estate. Based
on our review of the affidavit, we find that it
complies with the requirements of Rule 4505. Moreover, the Josephsons never disputed the affidavit. Therefore, we find that
the trial court was not required to take further evidence regarding attorney fees.
ments raised. In Belgard, the trial court granted
an evidentiary hearing on the issues. Belgard,
830 P.2d at 265. In Matsamas, the issues were
heard and ruled upon during trial. Matsamas,
808 P.2d at 1053. The trial courts thus waived
the requirements of Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Belgard, 830 P.2d at 266.
However, in this case, the termination of contract issue was not raised until the Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment. The trial court did
not take evidence or hold an evidentiary hearing
on the issue, but instead simply denied the Motion to Alter or Amend. Thus, the trial judge did
not "effectively waive[]" the Josephsons' requirement to preserve the issue for appeal. Id.
6. Even if the issue were properly before us, the
Estate would still prevail. The Josephsons argue
that the District Court's ruling that the Contract
was "paid in full" terminated the Contract and

CONCLUSION
The Estates action is not barred by res
judicata or collateral estoppel. Further, the
termination of contract issue is not properly
b e f o r e us
- Finally, no issues of fact exist
regarding the reasonableness of attorney
fees. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Estate.
JACKSON, J., concurs.
DAVIS, Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the majority's result to the
extent that defendants should be estopped to
assert defenses of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel because of the representations
of their counsel in the prior trial, and not
because res judicata and/or collateral estoppel would not otherwise apply to the facts of
this case.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that
" * "[e]stoppel is an equitable doctrine which
precludes parties from asserting their rights
where their actions render it inequitable to
allow them to assert those rights."'" Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155,
1159 n. 10 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Burrow
v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Utah App.
1990) (quotation omitted)). The test for determining whether estoppel is present "is
whether there is conduct, by act or omission,
by which one party knowingly leads another
party, reasonably acting thereon, to take
any rights under it. We disagree with the Josephsons' characterization of the District Court's
ruling. In its Judgment, the District Court conveyed the Property, the five shares of water
stock, and the right-of-way to the Josephsons. In
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
court stated that the Contract was "paid in full."
However, the court did not explicitly state that
the Contract was terminated. Indeed, it would
have been improper for the District Court to do
so since the court did not address other issues or
provisions under the Contract such as the promise to pay "all taxes and assessments of every
kind." The fact that some taxes and assessments
were due and owing at the time of the Judgment
is a strong indication that the District Court's
ruling did not terminate the Contract, but rather
was limited to the issues discussed.

680

Utah

888 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

some course of action, which will result in his
detriment or damage if the first party is
permitted to repudiate or deny his conduct
or representation." J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C.
Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 1975)
(footnote omitted); accord Triple I Supply,
Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298,
1301-02 (Utah 1982). Moreover,
"[w]here, as here, the delay in commencing
action was induced by the conduct of the
party sought to be charged the latter may
not invoke such conduct to defeat recovery.
An estoppel may arise although there was
no designed fraud on the part of the person sought to be estopped. To create an
equitable estoppel, 'it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using
such means or taking such action as lay in
his powrer, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from
loss'
'It is well-settled that a person
by his conduct may be estopped to rely
upon these defenses. Where the delay in
commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it cannot be availed
of by him as a defense/ "
Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456
P.2d 159, 162 (1969) (quotation and footnote
omitted).
Although the court's opinion does not contain an estoppel analysis, it correctly concludes that, based upon undisputed affidavits,
representations were made by defendants to
plaintiffs either prior to or during trial to the
effect that defendants would pay any taxes
and assessments regarding the property. In
reasonable reliance on those representations,
the Estate would have no reason to assert a
counterclaim for the taxes or assessments in
the prior action. Having induced the Estate
to refrain from pursuing a counterclaim for
taxes and assessments, defendants cannot
now rely upon the defenses of res judicata
and/or collateral estoppel.
In my view, the requirements for res judicata and collateral estoppel set out in the
court's opinion are present here and, but for
the equitable estoppel created by defendants,
would be valid defenses to plaintiffs claim.
Having determined that those defenses are
not available to defendant, there is no need
to consider the issues of whether the court in

the prior proceeding determined that the
contract was terminated or whether plaintiffs claims were ripe for adjudication.
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Kirk W. DALL, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, The Utah State Board of
Pardons, and The Utah State Psychiatric Security Review Board, Respondents
and Appellees.
No. 930722-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 27, 1994.

Patient at state hospital petitioned for
extraordinary writ following decision of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB)
to transfer his custody from state hospital to
Board of Pardons, and the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Leslie A. Lewis,..,
denied petition. Patient appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Orme, Associate P.J., held
that the record did not support the PSRB's
determination that patient had received the
maximum benefit available from treatment at
the hospital, and thus the transfer of custody
to the Board of Pardons and resulting confinement at state prison were unlawful.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Administrative Law and
<s=>701
Mental Health <S=>436.1

Procedure

Psychiatric Security Review Board
(PSRB) is exempt from the provisions of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, so
there is no statutory right of direct appeal
from its decisions. U.C.A.1953, 63-46bK2)(c).

